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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Cost management is concerned with planning and controlling the costs of the 
resources consumed performing organizational activities. Specifically, cost management 
produces useful information by identifying, collecting, measuring, classifying, and 
reporting the cost of products and other objects to improve internal decision making and 
to promote continuous improvement (Hansen and Mowen, 2003, p. 2). One focus of cost 
management is to eliminate non-value added activities by reducing unnecessary inputs 
while at least maintaining valued added outputs. Thus, an underlying purpose of cost 
management is to improve efficiency. A particular set of costs gaining attention is 
environmental costs. Environmental costs have begun to play a major role in the policy-
making decisions of firms because of growing compliance costs and a surge in social 
awareness. As a result, the environment is increasingly being used as a strategic tool to 
reduce cost and increase competitive advantage. 
However, this idea has not been without its obstacles. The traditional approach to 
pollution control is guided by regulations that mandate both pollution reduction and the 
specific methods required to reduce the pollution. Under this approach, pollution 
reduction is often accompanied by a regress in productivity because valuable inputs are 
diverted from the production of good output. This causes either an increase in cost or a 
reduction of good output, either of which reduces efficiency. Therefore, the traditional 
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approach views pollution reduction as having a direct and negative impact on 
efficiency. 
Many firms have begun to search for a way to use environmental cost 
management as part of an alternative to the traditional pollution control model. A 
paradigm that has emerged is eco-efficiency. Eco-efficiency is a philosophy that 
encourages a search for and adoption of environmental improvements that allow a firm to 
become more environmentally responsible while at the same time becoming more 
profitable. The general premise of eco-efficiency is that firms can voluntarily adopt 
innovative and proactive pollution reduction methods that will reduce environmental 
degradation and lower costs. However, in order to accomplish this goal firms must have a 
solid understanding of their environmental cost function and how it is affected by actions 
taken to reduce pollution. Further, they must perceive that some benefit will emerge from 
adoption. Porter and Van de Linde (1991, 1995a, 1995b) have provided additional 
support for eco-efficiency by developing the Porter Hypothesis. The underlying principle 
of the Porter Hypothesis is that in general agents within firms may have limited 
rationality regarding the effects of eco-efficiency and consequently must be guided by an 
open intervention to make them understand how reductions in pollution promote 
efficiency. Thus, the Porter Hypothesis assumes: (1) pollution is a form of economic 
inefficiency; (2) environmental regulations provide a signal to companies to improve; and 
(3) that properly designed regulations trigger innovations that may partially offset or 
more than fully offset environmental costs. Therefore, the basis of the Porter Hypothesis 
is that environmental regulations can be used to induce firms to adopt eco-efficient 
behavior. 
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To date most of the evidence used to support eco-efficiency and the Porter 
Hypothesis has been anecdotal and based largely on the results of case studies [(Ditz et al 
(1995); Epstein (1996); De Simone and Popoff (1997); and Schmidheiny and Zorraquin 
(1996)]. To establish the validity of the Porter Hypothesis, properly crafted regulations 
must be present and there must be evidence that these regulations induce eco-efficient 
behavior. The Federal 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (1990 CAAA) fit the definition 
of a properly crafted regulation. The 1990 CAAA require certain utilities to reduce their 
sulfur dioxide (S02) emissions but do not mandate how these reductions are to be 
achieved [U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (1994) and 
(1997); EPA (2000); Swift (2001, p. 315)]. 
There has been some investigation of the 1990 CAAA and the results it has 
produced. Hughes (2000) studies firms affected by Phase One of the 1990 CAAA. His 
study examines the relationship between the market value of equity and S02 emissions 
for the period 1986 - 1993. He finds that S02 emissions have value relevance for the 
years 1989, 1990, and 1991 (there exists a significant negative relationship between 
market value and S02). This relationship disappears subsequent to 1991. Hughes (2000) 
suggests that the decline in the value relevance of S02 emissions may be attributable to 
endogenous changes in the firm's production processes. No direct evidence is provided to 
support this suggestion. Nor does the study provide any direct evidence about changes in 
productive efficiency attributable to the regulation. 
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1.1 Purpose of the Study 
To date, no study has provided a direct test of the Porter Hypothesis. The 1990 
CAAA provides an attractive opportunity to carry out this type of test. The purpose of 
this study is to evaluate the Porter Hypothesis by investigating how endogenous changes 
made by utilities in response to Phase One of the 1990 CAAA affect productive 
efficiency. The 1990 CAAA is useful because it represents a properly designed regulation 
that focuses on outcomes rather than methods and thus, provides a direct association 
between improved productivity and process improvements and innovation. If the Porter 
Hypothesis is valid, then utilities subject to the 1990 CAAA should engage in process 
improvement and process innovation, thus exhibiting an increase in productive efficiency 
relative to performance prior to the Act. Such an outcome will provide direct support for 
eco-efficiency and its position that firms can maintain or increase good output while 
simultaneously reducing environmental costs and bad output. 
Finding evidence to support the Porter Hypothesis is important for several 
reasons. First, examining the effects of regulations on productive efficiency is 
particularly important because benchmarks can be established to evaluate how 
regulations impact profitability. Moreover, by concentrating on the relationship between 
environmental regulations and efficiency, smarter and finer trade-offs between business 
and environmental concerns will surface. Second, this evidence can serve to alter the 
attitudes and polices of management with respect to the environment. Third, evidence 
supporting eco-efficiency could also contribute to the potential reduction of the 
traditional adversarial relationship between the government and the business community 
relative to environmental issues. Fourth, it can be used to craft better environmental 
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· regulations and other public policies. Finally, this evidence would also establish the 
importance of a role for an environmental cost management system and thus, serves as a 
response to those who suggest the accounting profession should create a more accurate 
signal of how environmental performance affects firm value [Beets and Souther (1999, p. 
129); Ilinitch et al. (1998, p. 384); Schmidheiny et al. (1996, p. 129); AICPA (2002, p. 
3)]. 
The next chapter provides a literature review relative to environmental cost 
management, eco-efficiency, and the Porter Hypothesis. A discussion of the traditional 
and eco-efficient pollution control models is presented in Chapter Three. Hypotheses 
development and the approach to measuring relative efficiency is presented in Chapter 
Four. The research design is presented in Chapter Five. The empirical results are 
provided in Chapter Six. Finally, conclusions are presented in Chapter Seven. 
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CHAPTER2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Environmental Cost Management 
Cost management creates more value at a lower cost by integrating production, 
strategy, and management accounting into a discipline that focuses on value chain 
analysis, strategic positioning, and cost driver analysis (Shank, 1989, p. 47; Cooper and 
Slagmulder, 1998, p. 14). Creating more value at a lower cost suggests that increasing 
productive efficiency is a major objective of cost management. Process improvement 
and process innovation (business reengineering) are the principal sources of productivity 
improvements. Process improvements represent the elimination of technical 
inefficiencies whereas process innovations change the underlying production technology 
to achieve increased efficiency. Both approaches attempt to eliminate waste by finding 
better ways to produce (Hansen and Mowen, 2000, p. 376). 
Environmental quality management is an area that may benefit from the use of 
cost management. The goal of environmental quality management is to reduce pollution 
and improve firm value by transforming existing practices (Bhat, 1998, p. 32). The 
marriage of environmental quality management with cost management is referred to as 
environmental cost management. Environmental costs are all the costs incurred by a firm 
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to prevent, control, and clean up pollution. Environmental costs are important because of 
their magnitude. Wong (2001, p. 52) reports that environmental remediation is a $186 
billion-dollar-a-year business industry. A recent analysis of the use of pollution control as 
a competitive weapon found that environmental costs could be as high as 20 percent of 
total operating costs (Bhat, 1996, p. 11 ). Further, a study by the World Resources 
Institute found that when the costs of labor, maintenance and operating activities were 
properly classified, the level of environmental costs went from 3 percent to 22 percent of 
the operating costs of an oil refinery (Ditz et al., 1995, p. 15). In another study, a small 
metal products manufacturer initially estimated its environmental costs at $50,000. An 
examination of direct and indirect costs and those imbedded in other accounts showed 
real annual environmental cost at about $1 million (Kunes, 2001, p. 72). 
The emerging area of environmental cost management is receiving more attention 
not only because environmental costs are significant but also because there is increasing 
evidence to suggest that improving environmental performance can actually reduce 
environmental costs. For example, Baxter, a global pharmaceutical firm, established a 
proactive program to improve environmental performance. In 1994, the program reduced 
hazardous waste and produced cost avoidances of $23 .4 million (Schmidheny et al., 
1996, p.71). Similarly, Hyde Tool, a small manufacturer of industrial tools, established a 
pollution reduction program that reduced wastewater from 29 million to 1.25 million 
gallons while saving over $200,000 annually (Epstein, 1996, p. 157). Cracker Barrel 
likewise found that changes in production processes could bring significant savings. 
Working with suppliers to develop new ways to reduce trash, the company dramatically 
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reduced the amount of disposable cardboard and saved more than $100,000 annually 
(Epstein, 1996, p. 47). 
2.2 Eco-Efficiency 
The above cases suggest that firms can use cost management to create 
opportunities to maintain or increase good outputs, reduce bad outputs, and improve 
performance by reducing costs. Thus, environmental cost management should focus on 
gaining insights about the environmental cost function and how it is affected by pollution 
reduction. Firms can use the behavior of the environmental cost function as a signal of 
when, where, and how to manage environmental performance by evaluating the efficiency 
with which inputs are used to create good as well as bad (i.e., pollution) outputs [Fare et 
al. (1996); Tyteca (1996); Tyteca (1997); and Tyteca, (1999)]. This link is a provocative 
concept because it has been argued that reductions in pollution actually increase 
productive efficiency and thereby reduce costs (King and Lenox, 2002, p. 289). 
This approach to environmental cost management is essentially equivalent to a 
pollution control strategy called eco-efficiency. Eco-efficiency is a management 
philosophy that encourages a search for and adoption of environmental improvements 
that allow a firm to become more environmentally responsible while at the same time 
becoming more profitable (WBCSD, 2000a, p. 4). The goal of eco-efficiency is to obtain 
economic and ecological efficiency through the optimal use of inputs. Thus, eco-
efficiency differs from traditional environmental management because it uses a value 
chain approach to make a direct connection between environmental targets and firm 
profitability by including the efficient use of the environment as part of the strategic 
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planning of the company [Cramer (1999, p. 54); President's Council on Sustainable 
Development (1996b, p. 1)]. Specifically, firms exhibit eco-efficient behavior when they 
adopt innovative and creative methods to produce more or the same level of useful goods 
and services while simultaneously reducing environmental degradation, resource 
is completely voluntary and not encumbered by unyielding regulations. Thus, the best 
--
outcomes from adopting eco-efficiency are achieved when firms have a solid 
understanding of their environmental cost function and the benefits that accrue from 
pollution reduction. 
2.3 The Porter Hypothesis 
The productivity gains and innovation benefits associated with eco-efficiency 
have caused a number of firms to take the concept seriously and to reevaluate how to 
manage their interaction with the environment. However, many other firms have 
continued to guide their environmental activities using a traditional focus. Traditionally, 
the relationship between environmental quality and economic performance has been 
framed under the assumption that it is driven by regulations. This framework assumes 
that technology, products, and processes remain unchanged in the presence of regulation, 
and regulation thus inevitably raises costs and reduces productivity (Porter, 1991, p. 5). 
However, Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995a, 1995b) take exception to 
this premise by assuming that pollution is a form of economic inefficiency and that 
environmental regulations provide a signal to companies to improve. Moreover, their 
research suggests, in what has become referred to as the Porter Hypothesis, that properly 
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designed environmental regulations trigger innovations that may partially offset or more 
than fully offset environmental costs. Properly designed environmental regulations are 
those that emphasize outcomes and not methods and thereby encourage process 
improvements and process innovations. Thus, the objective of properly designed 
regulations is to promote economic efficiency while at the same time reducing 
environmental degradation. The Porter Hypothesis therefore maintains that properly 
designed environmental regulations are those that encourage eco-efficient behavior. 
The need to craft a properly designed regulation is recognized by the President's 
Council on Sustainable Development. The Council concludes that traditional approaches 
to regulation are too inflexible and costly and suggests that while regulations should 
establish environmental standards they should also allow firms greater flexibility in 
achieving them (The President's Council on Sustainable Development, 1996a, p. 28). In 
return, companies can pursue technological innovations that will result in superior 
environmental protection at a lower cost. Moreover, by concentrating on the relationship 
between environmental regulations and efficiency, firms can identify smarter and finer 
trade-offs between business and environmental concerns (Walley and Whitehead, 1994, 
p. 47). Indeed, as noted by Epstein and Roy (1997, p. 26), although environmental 
improvements are often spurred by regulatory requirements, corporations can use these 
mandates as an impetus to voluntarily discover product and process innovations that can 
yield substantial benefits to both the environment and the firm. 
Some theoretical support exists for the Porter Hypothesis. Mohr (2002) shows that 
regulations may be used to spur endogenous changes within a firm to create and make 
use of innovations that simultaneously alleviate pollution and increase productivity. 
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However, his model assumes that these results are achieved only when there is a single 
technology, the adoption of that technology is required, and that all market participants 
have full knowledge about the effects of adoption. 
Xepapadeas and Zeeuw (1999) also theoretically examine the Porter Hypothesis 
by considering firms' reactions to regulations with respect to both the type and quantity 
of the equipment investments made in response to changes in production processes. 
Using a model in which firms are allowed to invest in machinery with different 
characteristics, they isolate both a productivity and a profit-emission effect. They find 
that although stricter environmental policies cannot always be expected to provide win-
win situations in the sense of both reducing emissions and increasing profitability, it is 
reasonable to assume that trade-offs can be created such that the marginal decrease in 
pollution is increased and the marginal decrease in profits is reduced. 
To date, most of the evidence used to support eco-efficiency and the Porter 
Hypothesis has been anecdotal and based largely on the results of case studies [(Ditz et 
al. (1995); Epstein (1996); De Simone and Popoff (1997); and Schmidheiny and 
Zorraquin (1996)]. Hid (1998) criticizes this evidence, noting that it lacks a fair valuation 
of environmental parameters and does not include the reactions of standard setting bodies 
or the business community in its analyses. Indeed, as noted by Klaussen and McLaughlin 
(1996), while evidence suggests that there is a link between strong environmental 
performance and lower manufacturing costs, " .. .little empirical research has focused 
specifically on environmental management and firm financial performance" (Klaussen 
and McLaughlin, 1996, p. 1200). Even Porter and van de Linde admit that" ... a list of 
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case studies ... no matter how long, is not a complete substitute for careful empirical 
testing" (Porter and van der Linde, 1995a, p. 104). 
One empirical study, Myer (1992), investigates the Porter Hypothesis by 
comparing states with strict environmental laws to states that have more lax standards to 
determine whether the pursuit of environmental quality hinders economic growth and 
development. He finds that " ... there appears to be a moderate yet consistent association 
between environmentalism and economic growth" (Meyer, 1992, p.4). Jaffe et al. (1995) 
however, maintains that this correlation could be spurious, noting," ... the results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that poor states with no prospect of substantial growth will 
not enact tough environmental regulations" and that, " ... the literature on the Porter 
Hypothesis remains one with a high ratio of speculation and an anecdote to systematic 
evidence" (Jaffe et al., 1995, p. 157). He further observes that" ... there is little or no 
evidence supporting the revisionist hypothesis that environmental regulation stimulates 
innovation" (Jaffe et al., 1995, p. 157) and thus calls for more empirical investigations 
relative to the Porter Hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER3 
TRADITIONAL AND ECO-EFFICIENT POLLUTION MODELS 
3.1 Traditional Economic Theory of Production 
Traditional pollution control posits that a production possibilities frontier exists 
that describes all of the efficient combinations of outputs that can be generated given a 
finite set of resources and a given technology. The slope of the production possibilities 
frontier, known as the marginal rate of transformation (MR T), shows the rate at which the 
output of one good has to be sacrificed to increase the output of another. Relative to 
pollution control, outputs are classified as good or bad, where bad outputs correspond to 
pollutants. 
Figure One illustrates a two-output production process where a firm produces a 
good product, X, with a bad product, Y, as a by-product, using a fixed amount of 
resources. Notice that to reduce the pollution from Y2 to Y1, good output must be reduced 
from X2 to X1. Reducing bad output causes a diversion of resources from the production 
of good output, a costly activity (revenues must be sacrificed). Alternatively, good output 
can be maintained at the X2 level by acquiring additional resources to reduce Y2 to Y1, 
which is also a costly activity. Thus according to this model, a firm would have no 
incentive to reduce pollution. 
13 
3 .2 Traditional Pollution Control Regulation 
Because firms lack incentive to reduce pollution, the government has assumed an 
active role in pollution control (Kolstad, 2000, p.135 - 139). The traditional strategy of 
pollution control in the United States is command and control regulation (Pavetto and 
Bae, 1991, p. 27). Command and control regulations specify both the pollution output 
level allowed and the specific and strict methods of compliance (Kolstad, 2000, p. 139). 
Thus, command and control policies rely on the standardization of technologies and 
practices to achieve mandated environmental improvements. Moreover, results obtained 
under these methods usually become the benchmark for productive efficiency. 
Usually, command and control methods change slowly and are unlikely to be 
improved, thus over time firms may find themselves controlling pollution with 
technologies that no longer fit or prohibit innovations that could achieve comparable 
environmental protection at a lower cost (DeSimone and Popoff, 1997, p. 18). However, 
if the traditional approach is lacking firms may be evaluating their use of resources 
incorrectly and thus may not be aware of any additional benefits that could emerge from 
innovations. In fact, there are many who contend that the command and control policies 
are ineffective. For example, Goodstein (1999, p. 265) refers to the command and control 
regulatory strategy as cost-ineffective and notes that uniform technological mandates are 
unlikely to provide the cheapest pollution control system. He suggests that a flexible 
system could result in the same goals of efficiency, safety, and ecological sustainability at 
a much lower cost. DeSimone and Popoff (1997, p. 18) observe that strict and unyielding 
command and control statutes" ... require the installation of equipment when other 
options are available or pollutants have already been reduced using process change". 
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Kolstad (2000, p. 140) observes that the restriction of choice allowed a polluter might 
preclude any opportunity to combine reduced pollution and cost savings. All of these 
observations suggest the command and control regulatory approach discourages 
innovations that may lead to better environmental quality and lower costs. Furthermore, 
command and control methods may discourage firms from improving environmental 
quality by increasing productive efficiency. 
Thus, the command and control approach has come under question because it 
does not encourage firms to improve processes or search for new and innovative methods 
to produce. Further, there is evidence to suggest that when actions taken beyond those 
mandated are encouraged, additional benefits are produced. For instance, Rockwell 
voluntarily implemented a plan to use resources more efficiently by redesigning products 
to improve environmental quality. Income from these programs offset the costs of 
disposing of hazardous wastes and returned over $300,000 to the business (Epstein, 1996, 
p. 46). Moreover, the 3M Corporation began running its pollution prevention pays 
program in 1975 with the aim of preventing pollution at its source. By improving process 
efficiency, the firm reduced emissions and netted more than $750 million in savings over 
the last two decades (DeSimone and Popoff, 1997, p. 4). 
3.3 Eco-Efficiency Inducing Regulation 
The aforementioned cases suggest the possibility that the traditional economic 
model of pollution control does not fully describe the benefits that firms can·capture by 
reducing pollutants. For example, the model portrayed in Figure One does not consider 
technical inefficiency and changes in technology. Figure Two illustrates the presence of 
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these two possibilities. In Figure Two, curve AC represents the production possibilities 
frontier given the current level of technology assuming no technical inefficiency. Curve 
AB represents the production possibilities frontier given the current level of technology 
assuming the existence of technical inefficiency. Curve AD represents the production 
possibilities frontier given that innovation has produced a new technology. 
Assume that curve AB represents the production possibilities frontier at the point 
in time when the firm is mandated to reduce its level of pollution from Y2 to Y1. The 
current level of output is (X2, Y 2). With the given level of inefficiency, and assuming no 
effort is made to increase productive efficiency, reducing Y 2 to Y 1 would produce a 
reduction in good output from X2 to X1. However, if the mandate stimulates process 
improvements that target the level of technical inefficiency, it is possible to reduce Y2 to 
Y 1 while increasing good output from X2 to X3• On the other hand, assume that the 
mandate stimulates process innovation such that the production frontier becomes AD. 
This suggests the possibility of reducing pollution to Y 1 while increasing output from X2 
to :x.i. 
As demonstrated, both process improvements and process innovation can reduce 
pollution and increase good output. These outcomes are consistent with eco-efficient 
behavior. Eco-efficiency goes beyond making simple efficiency improvements that are 
required by regulations and encourages creativity and innovation to reduce resource use 
and pollutant release (OECD, 1998, p. 22-23). Thus, eco-efficiency expands traditional 
concepts by accepting the possibility that pollution can be reduced through process 
change and that less pollution will produce more value through improved efficiency and 
reduced costs (WBCSD, 1996, p.4). 
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However, unless there is a stimulus, firms may not voluntarily pursue eco-
efficient outcomes. 1 A key economic assumption is that agents make rationale decisions 
using the best available and relevant information. However, because information may not 
readily available or cannot be easily interpreted, agents often have limited rationality. 
This is particularly true when evaluating environmental costs because they are often 
incorrectly reported. King and Lenox (2002, p. 290) provide an analysis of how firms 
may overlook or not pursue pollution control opportunities that extend beyond the 
traditional approach. They contend that because traditional models promote controlling 
pollution at the "end of the pipe-line", many firms devalue and underestimate the benefits 
of proactive waste prevention .. Additionally, because the potential benefits of alternatives 
are uncertain, hard to observe, difficult to link to a particular source, and are often 
delayed or extended over time, information searches related to them might prove 
unprofitable. Given this, managers do not factor in the value of innovation as an 
unexpected benefit of waste prevention. Therefore, a profit-maximizing manager 
concerned about the marginal cost of reducing pollution is more likely to be influenced 
by the expected benefits of known pollution reduction methods. 
These impediments to eco-efficiency have been noted in the literature. For 
example, Swift (2001) notes that " .. .in order to broadly support incentives for efficiency, 
innovation, and pollution prevention, environmental regulations must create a continuous 
driver for pollution reduction" (Swift, 2001, p. 410). Thus, eco-efficiency should be 
1 Evidence has shown that firms may use satisficing rather than optimizing behavior when complying with 
environmental regulations [Porter and Van der Linde (1995a) and Goodstein (1999, p.265). For instance, 
firms may discover a better technique for pollution prevention at one location but opt not to adopt it 
because to do so might legally bind them to upgrade pollution control at other facilities which may not be 
cost effective. 
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encouraged by regulations that create economic incentives, allow greater use of market 
forces, and encourage innovative environmental technologies that are stimulated and 
maintained over time by continuous innovation [DeSimone and Popoff (1997, p. 153); 
Cramer (1997, p. 58); WBCSD (2000a); and OECD (1998, p. 10)]. 
3.4 The Federal 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
To establish the validity of eco-efficiency and the Porter Hypothesis, two 
conditions must be met: (1) properly crafted regulations must be present and (2) there 
should be evidence that these regulations induce eco-efficient behavior. The Federal 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments (1990 CAAA) fit the definition of a properly crafted 
regulation. The 1990 CAAA is a properly crafted regulation because it requires certain 
entities to reduce pollution emissions but do not mandate how these reductions are to be 
achieved [U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (1994) and 
(1997); EPA (2000); Swift (2001, p. 315)]. 
Among the numerous provisions of the 1990 CAAA is Title IV, which mandates 
that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) establish an Acid Rain Program to 
reduce the adverse affects of acidic deposition ( acid rain)2. Acid rain is formed largely 
from emissions of sulfur dioxide (S02) and nitrogen oxides (NOx)- The objectives of Title 
IV were to be achieved primarily through domestic reductions of S02 and NOx emissions 
by electric utilities. The electric utility industry was targeted under Title IV because its 
fossil fuel plants were the main source of S02 emissions and a major source ofNOx 
2 The majority of this discussion can be located in two reports prepared by the Energy Information 
Administration that discuss the initial plans and early results of complying with the 1990 CAAA. For more 
information, see US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (1994) and (1997). 
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emissions in the United States. Efforts to reduce these emissions were divided into two 
time periods: Phase One and Phase Two. The 1990 CAAA identified 110 large plants 
known to be especially dirty and then mandated specified reductions in S02 and NOx 
output that these plants had to achieve by 1995. These mandated levels of S02 and NOx 
output had to be maintained by these 110 plants through 1999. This period of 1995 to 
1999 defines what is referred to as Phase One. Thus, plants affected by Phase One are 
referred to as Phase One plants. Phase Two, which began in the year 2000, tightened the 
total annual emissions limits imposed on Phase One plants and, in addition, expanded the 
lower mandated levels to all other (i.e., non-Phase One) electric utility plants. 
The 1990 CAAA approach to reducing S02 was especially noteworthy because it 
represented the first large-scale attempt to establish overall emissions levels through a 
market structure that used allowances to govern how much S02 an electric utility was 
permitted to emit. Each allowance authorizes an electric utility to emit one ton of S02. 
The total allowances provided to a utility define the S02 output limits. Thus, to be in 
compliance with the law, an electric utility could not emit more S02 than the allowances 
held. Electric utilities that reduced their emissions below the number of allowances held 
could elect to trade allowances within their system, bank them for future use, or sell them 
to other utilities. The 1990 CAAA approach to controlling S02 was a radical departure 
from the traditional "command and control" approach because it allowed electric utilities 
to choose any method they deemed appropriate to meet environmental standards. Thus, 
for the first time electric utilities had a real opportunity to use process improvements and 
innovations to reduce emissions and improve efficiency (EPA, 2000, p.3). 
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Two events occurred subsequent to the passage of the 1990 CAAA that had an 
effect on Phase One. First, 54 additional plants were brought into Phase One [U.S. 
Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (1994, p. 38) and (1997, p. 
vii); Swift (2001, p.321)]. Thus, in 1995 164 plants underwent the annual reconciliation 
process administered by the EPA to determine compliance with Phase One (EPA, 1996a, 
p. l ). Second, the initial rules governing Phase One NOx reductions were vacated in 1994 
and not replaced until early 1995 (U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information 
Administration, 1997, p. 39). Therefore, NOx emissions reductions were not required 
until 1996 (EPA, 1996b, p. 5).3 
There has been some empirical investigation of the reaction to the 1990 CAAA 
and the outcomes it has produced. Hughes (2000) studies firms affected by Phase One of 
the 1990 CAAA,. His study examines the relationship between the market value of equity 
and S02 emissions for the period 1986 - 1993. He finds that S02 emissions have value 
relevance for the years 1989, 1990, and 1991 (there exists a significant negative 
relationship between market value and S02). This relationship disappears subsequent to 
1991. Hughes (2000) suggests that the decline in value relevance of S02 emissions may 
be attributable to endogenous changes in the firm's production processes made in 
response to the Act. However, no direct evidence is provided to support this suggestion. 
Nor does the study provide any direct evidence about changes in productive efficiency 
attributable to the regulation. 
3 Because reductions in NOx are not r~quired until 1996, neither the calculation of the change in NOx 
emissions nor the effect of any such change on efficiency is included as a part of this study. 
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CHAPTER4 
STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Operational Hypotheses 
The traditional pollution control model assumes that reductions in pollution 
reduce efficiency because additional costs are incurred or inputs are diverted from the 
production of good to bad outputs. Pure eco-efficiency assumes that firms are rational 
and understand that reducing pollution will improve efficiency. Therefore, they will· 
voluntarily seek out and adopt innovative ways to create benefits that outweigh the costs 
incurred to reduce the pollution. However, given the lack of information about 
environmental costs, the connection between pollution reduction and improvements in 
efficiency is not always made. Thus, intervention induced eco-efficiency, which is the 
underlying base of the Porter Hypothesis, assumes that regulations are required to guide 
firms to the understanding that pollution reductions improve efficiency. 
Phase One of the 1990 CAAA offers an attractive opportunity for testing the 
validity of the Porter Hypothesis. It mandates reduced levels of S02 for a specific subset 
of electric utility plants without indicating how to achieve the reductions while exempting 
all other plants from this mandate. The Act thus identified two groups of plants: those 
that have a relatively high level of pollution and those that have a relatively lower level of 
pollution. Dividing plants into high and low polluting categories at a particular point in 
21 
time creates the ability to execute a cross-sectional test of Porter's claim that pollution is 
equivalent to economic inefficiency (Porter and van der Linde, 1995a and 1995b). Thus, 
the first hypothesis, pertaining to cross-sectional relative efficiency, can be stated in the 
alternative form as: 
H1: Plants with lower pollution will be relatively more efficient 
than plants with higher pollution. 
Cross sectional relative efficiency will be evaluated in 1990 and 1995. Investigating cross 
sectional relative efficiency in 1990 is a test of pure eco-efficiency. Its purpose is to· see if 
eco-efficiency initially holds prior to intervention. If no such evidence exists, there is 
support for the assumption that the traditional pollution model is present in 1990 and 
thus, provides a benchmark for evaluating efficiency after intervention. Therefore, the 
null hypothesis pertaining to the 1990 cross sectional relative efficiency assumes that the 
efficiency of the Phase One plants will be greater than the efficiency of the Non-Phase 
One plants. 
In 1995, an eco-efficient inducing regulation has been introduced. If the 
traditional view holds, then the Phase One firms will become less efficient because they 
are required to reduce pollution. However, the Porter Hypothesis would say that since the 
requirements of the 1990 CAAA to reduce pollution leaves open the question of how to 
achieve these reductions, eco-efficient behavior will be triggered and improvements in 
efficiency will occur. Thus, investigating cross sectional relative efficiency in 1995 is a 
test of eco-efficiency with intervention that uses 1990 as a base. The objective is to 
determine if intervention of the right kind (i.e., eco-efficient inducing) will reduce 
pollution and thus cause the efficiency of those subject to the Act to increase relative to 
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those not subject to the Act. In addition, if the Phase One plants were more efficient in 
1990 and if Porter is right, then in 1995 they should stay more efficient relative to Non-
Phase One plants even though they have been required to reduce pollution. Thus, the null 
hypothesis pertaining to the 1995 cross sectional efficiency assumes that the efficiency of 
the Non-Phase One plants will be greater than the efficiency of the Phase One plants. 
Another aspect of the Porter Hypothesis is that government intervention induces 
plants to increase productive efficiency subsequent to an intervening event. Thus, the 
grouping of plants into two categories also allows the development of a longitudinal 
analysis. A longitudinal analysis provides a more complete assessment of the Porter 
Hypothesis because it simultaneously evaluates the assumptions that: (1) pollution is a 
form of economic inefficiency; (2) environmental regulations provide a signal to 
improve; and (3) properly designed regulations trigger innovations that may partially 
offset or more than fully offset environmental costs. 
Because of the 1990 CAAA, Phase One plants will have lower pollution during 
Phase One than pre-Phase-One. Again, if pollution is equivalent to economic 
inefficiency, then productive efficiency for the Phase One plants should increase over 
time. Essentially, if productive efficiency is measured prior to Phase One years and then 
measured during the Phase One years, the relative efficiency of Phase One plants should 
increase. A natural control group (non-Phase One plants) exists to determine whether a 
change in relative productive efficiency for Phase One plants is specifically attributable 
to the Act's mandate. Thus, the second hypothesis, pertaining to longitudinal relative 
efficiency, can be stated in the alternative form as: 
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H2: Plants that have been mandated to reduce pollution will be 
relatively more efficient after the mandate than before the 
mandate. 
Both Phase One and Non-Phase One longitudinal relative efficiency will be evaluated. 
The null hypothesis pertaining to the longitudinal relative efficiency of the Phase One 
plants assumes that the efficiency of the 1990 Phase One plants will be greater than the 
efficiency of the 1995 Phase One plants. The null hypothesis of the relative efficiency of 
the Non-Phase One plants assumes that the efficiency of the 1995 Non-Phase One plants 
will be greater than the efficiency of the 1990 Non-Phase One plants. 
4.2 The Data Envelopment Analysis Methodology 
4.2.1 Measuring Relative Efficiency 
In general, efficiency is best measured in relative terms where one firm is 
compared to another. A firm can also be compared to itself at different times to obtain a 
trend of how well the firm has performed over a period of time. Relative comparisons are 
especially important to environmental management because they provide a baseline to set 
improvement goals based on external environmental regulations, internal business 
practices, and emerging technological implications (Ruch and Roper, 1992, p.15). 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is an empirical method used to estimate the 
relative efficiency of a group of decision-making units (DMU) with similar goals and 
objectives (e.g., DMUs operating in the same industry). DEA computes these relative 
measures of efficiency using all of the inputs and outputs of all of the DMUs in the 
reference group. Thus, DEA uses input-output quantity data to estimate a DMU's 
production function using linear approximations to map the envelope (frontier) of the 
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input-output data (Callen,1991). DMUs operating on the frontier are relatively more 
efficient than those operating off the frontier. Figure Three portrays a one-input, one-
output production frontier, assuming variable returns to scale. As can be seen, DEA 
estimates a discrete piecewise frontier by enveloping the data to reveal relative efficiency 
relationships. DMUs C, F, M, D, and I form the efficient production frontier because 
given their input levels, they are able to produce more output relative to any other DMU. 
DMUs L, G, E, and Hare less efficient and thus, all fall within the interior, off the 
frontier. 
DEA uses linear programming to measure the relative efficiency of each DMU in 
the reference group. Each time an optimization is carried out, a set of weights is 
produced. This set of weights defines a hypothetical composite DMU using the outputs 
and inputs of all DMUs within the reference group. Constraints in the linear 
programming model require outputs of the composite DMU to be greater than or equal 
to the outputs of the DMU being evaluated. If the inputs for the composite DMU can be 
shown to be less than the inputs for the DMU being evaluated, the composite DMU will 
thus produce the same, or more, output for less input. In this case., DEA indicates that the 
composite DMU is more efficient than the DMU being evaluated. Moreover, because the 
composite DMU is based on all DMUs in the reference group, the DMU being evaluated 
can be judged relatively inefficient to all other DMUs in the group. 
Program A offers a DEA model that illustrates these relationships for n DMUs, m 
outputs, and p inputs: 
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Mine 
subject to: 
where 
n 
Lwioij ~ okj, j = 1,2, ... m (A) 
i=l 
n 
Lwilir :::;;E11cr, r=l,2, ... p 
i=l 
€ = the efficiency or "DEA " scores assigned by DEA 
Oij = output j for DMU i 
Iir = input r for DMU i 
Okj = the output j for DMU k 
Ikr = input r for DMU k, where k denotes the DMU being evaluated for its 
efficiency relative to all others (target DMU) 
w = the weight assigned by DEA 
The model selects a set of weights that minimize€. This is equivalent to minimizing the 
input resources required by the composite DMU. Since the target DMU is one of then 
DMUs, it is possible that the target DMU could be selected as the composite DMU by 
setting Wk = 1. The value of€ lies between zero and one. If € < 1, indicating that the 
composite DMU requires less input resources, the target DMU is judged as relatively 
inefficient. If€.= 1, this indicates that the target DMU uses no more inputs than those 
required by the composite DMU. In this instance, the target DMU is on the efficient 
frontier. 
DEA has several characteristics that make its use attractive. First, it accepts that 
inefficiencies are real, assigns a value to them, and focuses on the impact of these 
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inefficiencies on performance. Thus, DEA directs attention to the potential benefits from 
increasing outputs and/or decreasing inputs (Turner and DePree, 1991, p. 3). Second, the 
DEA model is Pareto optimal, meaning that any input variable reduction or output 
augmentation can be effected without worsening other model variables (Bowlin, 1999, p. 
292). Third, DEA identifies the best performing DMUs and provides a valid and 
meaningful scalar measure of performance for each DMU under evaluation by comparing 
them to the best performing DMU (Bowlin, 1995, p. 541). Fourth, DEA creates its 
frontier based on the observed behavior of the best performing organizations using an 
approach free of a priori specifications. Thus, the weights assigned by the DEA model 
are obtained as part of the solution of a mathematical programming problem that is free 
of potential biases that might accompany traditional benchmarking methodologies 
(Bowlin, 1999, p. 292). Finally, DEA does not require a specified functional form and 
therefore allows flexibility in the type of production function used by each DMU under 
investigation. As a result, a DMU is given the best possible rating based on its actual 
production function. This characteristic of DEA is significant because it recognizes the 
many and diverse ways firms can combine resources to produce output. This is an 
important feature because it simultaneously considers all resource inputs and outputs, 
allows interdependence and trade-offs among these variables, and promotes the inclusion 
of effects that might be intangible and otherwise excluded (Kleinsorge et al., 1992, p. 
360). 
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4.2.2 DEA for the Plant Setting 
Program A serves as the model for measuring relative efficiency at the power 
plant level. For the cross-sectional analysis, each power plant corresponds to a DMU. 
For the longitudinal analysis, each power plant in a different year defines a DMU (thus a 
DMU is a plant-year combination). The plant DEA reference group is composed of both 
high polluting and low polluting plants. To measure relative efficiency, outputs and 
inputs must be selected and defined. Prior studies have generally advocated the 
identification and measurement of variables deemed most relevant for a particular set of 
DMUs [Majumdar (1998, p. 816); Nunamker (1985, p. 56)]. Four variables will be 
selected for use in the plant-level DEA model. For electric utility plants, output is 
Kilowatt-hours (H). Three inputs will be used in the computation of DEA scores: 
Capital (K), Fuel Costs (F), and Operating Costs (C). With these definitions, relative 
efficiency for a plant based DMU is measured by the following program: 
subject to: 
n 
LwiHi ~Hk 
i=l 
n 
IwiFi ::;;EFk 
i=l 
n 
LwiKi ::;;EKk 
i=l 
n 
Iwici ::;;ECk 
i=l 
Mins 
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(B) 
Program B uses only good output and does not include bad output. Bad output is 
exogenous to the plant-level DEA model and is used to ensure that the reference group 
includes DMUs with significantly different levels of pollution. Traditional economic 
. theory assumes that reducing pollution requires either a reduction in good output or an 
increase in cost, either of which will reduce efficiency. The Porter Hypothesis assumes 
that reducing pollution will induce a plant to maintain or improve good output while 
using relatively less inputs and costs. Thus, the above plant-level DEA model allows a 
direct evaluation of whether or not lower levels of pollution bring about greater relative 
efficiency. 
The DEA inputs were identified in several ways. First, they are the inputs most 
widely used for performance measurement in the electric utility industry [Christensen and 
Greene (1976, p. 663); Cowing et al. (1981, p. 169)]. In addition, they are the most often 
identified inputs in the literature related to the calculation of DEA scores for the electric 
utility industry [Goto and Tsutsui (1998); Athanassopoulos et al. (1999); Fare et al. 
(1996); Tyteca (1997); Tyteca (1999); and Golany et al. (1994); Haeri et al. (1997); 
Forrester et al. (1998)]. 
Capital is the ability of the individual plant to produce electricity and is measured 
by the nameplate generating capacity of the plant. Nameplate generating capacity is the 
full-load capacity rating of a plant to continuously produce electricity. Its use as a proxy 
for capital is consistent with prior studies [Goto and Tsutsui (1998); Fare et al. (1996); 
Whiteman (1995)]. The cost of producing electricity consists of fuel and operating costs 
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(Freedman and Jaggi, 1994, p. 38).1 Fuel Costs represent all of the costs associated with 
the purchase, handling, and storage of fuel inputs burned as part of the chain reaction to 
generate electricity. These costs are the largest and most variable and sensitive item on a 
utility's list of production expenses (Bossong, 1999, p. 22). In fact, the respondents of a 
survey on issues related to electric utility plant operating activity suggest that the 
environmental impact of the fuel supply, as well as its availability and deliverability are 
important factors to consider when evaluating any reduction in production expenses 
(Doughty and Rode, 1995, p. 26). 
Operating Costs include the cost of labor and other expenses related to operating 
and maintaining a plant. Doughty and Rode (1995, p. 24) find that reducing operating 
expenses was ranked high among the major issues affecting the electric utility. Thus, an 
improving trend in operating costs usually indicates that there is a focus on streamlining 
operations and controlling costs. Finally, examining total production cost and its 
components is important because these categories are known to include many 
environmental costs [Joshi et al. (2001, pp. 172 - 175) and EPA (1995, p. 9)] and thus, 
can reflect whether costs are less for lower polluting DMUs than for higher polluting 
DMUs. !flower polluting DMUs have lower production costs, there is evidence to 
suggest that environmental costs decrease as environmental quality improves. 
1 Because of inflation, nominal prices from different years cannot be compared without making some 
adjustments. Thus, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) will be used to deflate 1995 to.1990 prices. This 
approach is consistent with other studies that examine the electric utility industry on a longitudinal basis 
(i.e., Freeman and Jaggi, 1994). CPI is a useful measure of inflation because it demonstrates the same 
general patterns as other indicators but with less volatility (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001, p. 450). 
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4.2.3 The Malmquist Productivity Index 
One of the sophisticated extensions of DEA is the ability to analyze productivity 
over time through the use of the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI). The MPI is a 
measure of productivity in a general production function framework. Fare et al. (1992, 
1994) introduced the MPI within a DEA setting to evaluate the change in DMUs between 
two time periods. One of the most important contributions of a DEA based MPI is that it 
can be multiplicatively decomposed into two parts: one accounting for the changes in 
efficiency (i.e., the catching-up effect) and the other accounting for changes in the 
efficient frontier technology (i.e., the frontier shift). When evaluating a DEA based MPI 
and its components, amounts greater than one indicate progress, while numbers smaller 
than one show regress. Amounts equal to one represent no change between the two 
periods. Evaluating temporal changes using the DEA based MPI is particularly relevant 
to an investigation of the electric utility industry's response to the 1990 CAAA because it 
has been suggested that plants reacted to the regulation by improving efficiency and 
developing innovative technology (Hughes, 2000, p. 211). 
Equation 1 illustrates the DEA based MPI and its components2• Denoted as 
M .1 2 , the DEA based MPI provides a comparison of the productivity of DMU j ], ' 
between two time periods 1 and 2. 
2 1 
M Ej2 Ej2 ,.2 jl,2 = £1 ·£2 = Mcj1,2·M Fj' 1,2 ET 
jl j2 
[1] 
2 The majority of this discussion of the DEA based Malmquist Productivity Index can be found in Forsund 
and Kittlesen (1998, p. 210). 
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The catching-up effect, M . , is related to the benefits a DMU gains through efficiency 
CJl,2 
improvements and thus, captures the relative movement of the observed DMU to the 
frontier. It is expressed as the ratio of the efficiency of the DMU relative to period 1 and 
period 2 frontiers. The numerator is the efficiency of the DMU relative to the second 
period frontier and the denominator is the efficiency of the DMU relative to the first 
period frontier. Therefore, a higher (lower) contemporary efficiency score for the second 
period implies increased ( decreased) efficiency over the two periods. 
The frontier technology shift, M;; , is the change in the efficient frontier 
between the two time periods. It is expressed by the ratio of the efficiency scores for the 
second period observation relative to the two technologies. The numerator expresses the 
scaling of period 2 inputs in order to be on period 1 technology, while the denominator 
expresses the scaling of the same input vector in order to be on period 2 technology, with 
both cases subject to period 2 observed output. This serves as a measure of technology 
shift, and is greater than one if period 2 technology is more efficient relative to period 1 
technology for the input-output mix of the period 2 observation. 
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CHAPTERS 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1 Sample Design and Data Collection 
Data were collected for Phase One plants for the periods 1990 and 1995. Data 
were also collected for a control group made up of non-Phase-One plants for the same 
periods. Control plants were selected using the Inventory of Power Plants in the United 
States for 1990. The control plants were matched based on nameplate generating capacity 
within a North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) region. There are nine 
NERC regions that encompass all the power in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 
NERC regions were formed in 1968 by the electric utility industry to promote the 
reliability and adequacy of bulk power in the electric systems of North America. Electric 
reliability councils have operating utilities as members. The function of these councils is 
to develop standards for bulk power supply and service reliability (Ferry, 2000, p. 28). 
The NERC region is used as part of the matching criteria because it is assumed that plants 
located within the same region face a common set of production, operating, and 
regulatory characteristics. In addition, prior studies have used NERC regions as a basis 
for cost comparisons [Blacconiere et al. (1997); Knutson, 1995)]. Nameplate generating 
capacity is the capital investment within a plant most directly associated with electricity 
production. Its use as a matching criteria is consistent with existing studies 
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making comparisons within the electric utility industry [Goto and Tsutsui (1998, p. 184); 
Whiteman, 1995, (1995, p.73)]. 
The input and output needs of DEA determined most of the data requirements of 
this study. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Form 1 reports were 
used to gather data related to the inputs and good output. Only major investor-owned 
electric utilities are required to submit a FERC Form 11. Data incorporated in a FERC 
Form 1 include income and earnings, operating and maintenance expenses, and various 
production statistics. Plant level financial and operating data are located in the "Steam 
Generating Plant Statistics for Large Plants" section of the FERC Form 1. The Energy 
Information Administration of the Department of Energy was the source for S02 
. emissions. Specific tests of Hypothesis Two required measures of state regulatory climate 
and state environmentalism. The assessments of state regulatory climate were obtained 
from the Value Line investment service. Proxies for state environmentalism were 
modeled after those reflected in Meyer (1995) where the score of each state was based on 
a set of twenty environmental policy indicators. Finally, the relative efficiencies (i.e., 
DEA scores) for this study were produced using DEA-Solver-Pro 3.0.2 
1 Investor owned utilities are those electric utilities owned by investors. In contrast, publicly owned utilities 
are those operated by the federal government, a state or local municipality, or an electric cooperative. 
2 There are several commercially available DEA software packages that combine inputs and outputs to 
produce DEA scores. DEA-Solver-Pro 3.0 is a windows based linear programming package developed by 
Saitech, Inc. 
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5.2 Tests of Hypotheses , 
5.2.1 Cross-Sectional Tests 
The 1990 CAAA identified two groups of plants: those that have a relatively high 
level of pollution and those that have a relatively lower level of pollution. The high 
polluters are Phase One plants that must reduce pollution by specified levels by 1995. 
Low polluters are those plants not required to reduce pollution until Phase Two. Thus, for 
1990, these two groups of plants were pooled and then the DEA model (Program B) was 
used to measure the relative efficiency of each DMU in the pooled group. Next, the 
difference in efficiency between the two groups was tested statistically. Since the 
theoretical distribution of the DEA efficiency score is unknown, the Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney rank-sum test was used to determine whether the difference between the two 
groups is significant (Cooper, Seiford, and Tone, 2000, p. 200 - 202). 
The rank-sum test is a nonparametric test based on the ranking of data. The test is 
conducted as follows. Let nA be the number of Phase One plants and nB the number of 
control plants. The DEA scores of the two groups are arranged in ascending order. These 
scores are then ranked from 1 to nA + nB. Tied observations receive an average of 
rankings. Next, the sum of the rankings for the Phase One firms is computed. Let S 
represent this sum. This statistic, S, follows a normal distribution with mean 
n A ( n A + n B + 1) and variance n An B ( n A + n B + 1) . A standardized test statistic will be 
2 12 
calculated and a one-tail test will be executed. The null hypothesis pertaining to the 1990 
cross-sectional relative efficiency assumes that the expected rank sum (efficiency) of the 
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Phase One plants is greater than the expected rank sum (efficiency) of the control plants. 
Rejection of the null hypothesis supports Hypothesis One. 
The same type of cross sectional analysis was conducted for the 1995 period. In 
1995 the pollution levels of Phase One plants should have been reduced. Further, because 
pollution is a form of technical inefficiency, a reduction in S02 output by the Phase One 
plants should result in an improvement in the efficiency of the Phase One plants. Non-
Phase One plants are not affected by the 1990 CAAA and thus, when evaluated relative 
to Phase One Plants, should not display a significant change in technical efficiency. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis pertaining to the 1995 cross-sectional relative efficiency 
assumes that the expected rank sum (efficiency) of the Non-Phase-One plants is greater 
than the expected rank sum (efficiency) of the Phase One plants. Rejection of the null 
hypothesis would support Hypothesis One. 
5.2.2 Longitudinal Tests 
5.2.2.1 Rank Sum Test 
Hypothesis Two assumes that plants mandated to reduce pollution will be 
relatively more efficient after the mandate than before the mandate. Thus, Hypothesis 
Two could be labeled as an interventionist hypothesis because it relies on an intervening 
event to bring about a reduction in pollution. Therefore, Hypothesis Two provides a more 
direct examination of the Porter Hypothesis. Following an approach similar to the cross-
sectional analysis, the 1990 and 1995 Phase One plants were pooled together and a DEA 
score was calculated for each DMU in the pooled group. Next, the difference in 
efficiency between the 1990 and 1995 Phase One plants was tested statistically using the 
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rank-sum test. The null hypothesis pertaining to the longitudinal relative efficiency of the 
Phase One plants assumes that the expected rank sum ( efficiency) of the 1990 Phase One 
plants is greater than the expected rank sum (efficiency) of the 1995 Phase One plants. 
Rejection of the null hypothesis supports Hypothesis Two. 
The same analysis was performed on the pooled group of 1990 and 1995 control 
plants. The null hypothesis pertaining to the longitudinal relative efficiency of the control 
plants assumes that the expected rank sum (efficiency) of the 1995 control plants is 
greater than the expected rank sum (efficiency) of the 1990 control plants. Rejection of 
the null hypothesis provides evidence that the difference in relative efficiency between 
the 1990 and 1995 Phase One plants is attributable to the intervening regulatory event 
and not to other time varying factors. This provides additional support for Hypothesis 
Two and would provide evidence that the Act induced eco-efficient behavior. 
5.2.2.2 Within-Plant-Type Regression Analysis 
DEA scores provide a measure of efficiency based on how well units of inputs are 
used to produce units of outputs. However, the indexes generated by DEA may not by 
themselves provide information relative to the empirical determinants of plant level 
efficiency. This issue is particularly important when efficiency is being evaluated before 
and after an intervening event. One approach to identifying the determinants of efficiency 
on a longitudinal basis is to run DEA scores as a dependent variable in a regression 
estimation against a set of hypothesized determinants. 
Therefore, in addition to the rank-sum test, a regression that explains differences 
among DEA scores may provide additional evidence concerning the validity of 
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Hypothesis Two. However, since DEA scores are bounded between zero and one, OLS 
may be biased and thus, may not be an appropriate estimation technique [Judge et al. 
(1987); Cooper, Seiford, and Tone (2000); Kennedy (1996)] To avoid this potential bias, 
a tobit censored regression model was used [Claggert et al. (1998); Olatubi and Dismukes 
(2000); Puig-Junoy (1998)]. In order to explain differences in efficiency on a longitudinal 
basis, three explanatory variables were chosen (predicted signs appear in parentheses): 
EVENT ( + ): Dummy variable equal to one if 1995 and equal to zero if 1990. 
CLIM (-): A variable that measures how favorably a state regulatory 
commission addresses rate increase requests. It assumes the 
following values: below average (-1 ), average (0), and above 
average ( + 1 ). 3 
STRICT(+): A variable that measures the stringency of state environmental 
policies. It assumes the following values: weak (-1 ), moderate (0), 
strong ( + 1). 4 
With the above variable definitions, the following tobit regression model was 
estimated: 
The regression analysis in Equation 2, referred to as Model 1, was conducted for both 
test and control plants. Hypothesis Two predicts that 1995 Phase One plants will be more 
efficient than 1990 Phase One plants. For the control plants there is no reason to expect 
3 This is the same approach used by Hughes (2000, p. 214) to assess the longitudinal impact of the state 
regulatory climates. 
4 The basis for these measures is Meyer (1995). 
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the efficiency to increase from 1990 to 1995. Thus, a significant positive P, for the test 
plants, coupled with an insignificant P, for the control group provides evidence 
supportive of Hypothesis Two. 
The other two explanatory variables are control variables although both have 
some bearing on the validity of the Porter Hypothesis. The electric utility industry falls 
under the control of state regulatory commissions. Prior research has implied that there is 
an association between a utility's value and the favorableness of its regulatory climate 
because state regulatory commissions are responsible for determining a utility's rate base 
and allowable operating expenses [Loudder et al. (1996); D'Souza et al. (2000); 
Blacconiere et al. (1997)]. However, critics have argued that rate-setting procedures by 
state regulatory commissions may not provide an incentive to become efficient (Bossong, 
1999, p. 9). In fact, many industry analysts argue that these procedures promote a 
wasteful application of resources, and provide utility managers with little motivation to 
cut costs or improve efficiency (Haeri et al., 1997, p. 26). The variable CLIM measures 
the propensity of state regulatory commissions to allow utilities to recover costs. As the 
value of CLIM increases, the propensity to allow cost recovery increases. As the ability 
to recover costs increases, the incentive for increasing productive efficiency decreases; 
thus, a negative sign for p2 is expected. Therefore, a favorable regulatory climate works 
against eco-efficiency. 
Environmental regulation varies across regions that impose greater or lesser 
penalties forpollution (King and Lenox, 2002, p. 295). State environmentalism is a 
measure of the level of environmental controls (polices, programs, statutes) adopted by a 
state to protect the environment. Ringquist and Feiock (1998) examine how state 
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environmental activities affect state industrial growth. They conclude that strong state 
environmentalism can reduce pollution without adversely impacting economic growth 
(Ringquist and Feiock, 1998, p. 21). The variable STRICT is a measure of the stringency 
of state environmentalism. If the Porter Hypothesis is valid, then efficiency should 
increase as STRICT increases. Thus, a significant positive sign for ~3 is expected. 
5.2.2.3 Between-Plant-Type Regression Analysis 
Model 1 provides a direct test of the longitudinal effects of the 1990 CAAA on 
technical efficiency on a within-plant-type basis. This analysis is useful because it 
provides information about the determinants of the efficiency of plants that have been 
impacted by a regulation in a similar fashion. A logical extension would be to examine 
the determinants of efficiency when both Phase One and Non-Phase One plants are 
considered. This analysis is important for several reasons. First, it produces relative 
measures of efficiency based on industry activity and thus, provides a benchmark of 
external performance. Second, when investigating the determinants of these industry 
measures, the variation in efficiency resulting from differences in plant type can be 
evaluated. This evaluation is useful because it provides insight relative to the effect of 
both the Act and plant-type on efficiency. 
To capture these effects, two conditions must be satisfied. First, longitudinal 
industry efficiency measures must be calculated. Thus, all of the 1990 and 1995 Phase 
One and Non-Phase One plants were pooled and the DEA model (Program B) was used 
to measure the relative efficiency of each DMU in the pooled group. Second, a variable 
must be identified that captures the effects of between-plant-type efficiency variation. 
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Therefore, TYPE was added to Model 1 and the following tobit regression, referred to as 
Model 2, was estimated: 
TYPE is a dummy variable equal to one if the plant is a Phase One plant and zero if it is 
a Non-Phase One plant. A significant and positive sign for fi4 is expected. Thus, a 
significant and positive fi4 coupled with a significant and positive ~1 suggests that 
intervention improves efficiency, that the improvements in efficiency differ between 
plant-type, and that Phase One plants are relatively more efficient after the intervention. 
All of these results provide additional support for Hypothesis Two. 
5.3 The Malmquist Productivity Index 
The DEA based MPI decomposes the change in productivity between two time 
periods into an efficiency and a technology effect. Thus, a direct test of the index and its 
components can provide information about the time varying effects of the 1990 CAAA 
on productivity and the extent to which efficiency and technology play a part in the 
change. Therefore, in a procedure similar to the rank sum tests and regression analyses, 
the 1990 and 1995 Phase One plants were pooled and DEA was used to produce a MPI, 
an efficiency, and a technology index for each DMU in the pooled group. The Porter 
Hypothesis assumes that plants mandated to reduce pollution would be more efficient 
after the mandate than before. Thus, there should be progress in the productivity of Phase 
One Plants between 1990 and 1995. Non-Phase One plants were not required to reduce 
pollution and thus, can be used to determine if the changes in the productivity, efficiency 
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and technology of the test group relate to the Act. Thus, in an approach similar to that 
conducted for the test group, the 1990 and 1995 control plants were pooled and DEA was 
used to produce MPI, efficiency, and technology indexes for each DMU in that group. 
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CHAPTER6 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1 Sampling Results 
Phase One of the 1990 CAAA affected 164 plants. Table 1 illustrates the process 
used to select Phase One plants for this study. Twenty-five plants were eliminated 
because they did not file a FERC Form 1. Fifteen Phase One plants were excluded 
because their plant level data was not included in the FERC Form 1 submission. Of the 
Phase One plants submitting data, 26 had missing or incomplete operating or financial 
information. Thus, based on data availability, 98 Phase One plants were on hand for 
matching. Fourteen of these remaining plants were eliminated because a suitable Non-
Phase One plant match could not be located. Therefore, based on data and matching 
availability, 84 of the original 164 Phase One plants were selected. Finally, after 
matching the selected Phase One plants with Non-Phase One counterparts the grand 
sample of the study consists of 168 plants (84 Phase One and 84 Non-Phase One). Table 
2 provides a distribution of the grand sample by NERC region. As indicated, all but one 
of the nine NERC regions is represented in the study. Table 3 lists the states included in 
the study. Twenty-nine states are represented, with Phase One and Non-Phase One plants 
located in 20 and 23 states, respectively. 
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6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 provides a summary of plant level data and the descriptive statistics for 
Phase One and Non-Phase One plants for 1990 and 1995. Panels A and B of Table 4 
reflect cross-sectional comparisons of Phase One and Non-Phase One plants at 1990 and 
1995, respectively. Panels C and D provide a longitudinal comparison of plant types 
across 1990 and 1995. Statistical tests of the means of the data presented in the Panels are 
also included to provide a preliminary assessment of the effects of the 1990 CAAA on 
the plants. 
Panel A of Table 4 indicates that there was not a significant difference between 
the nameplate capacities of the test and control plants in 1990. This provides evidence 
that efforts to match Phase One with Non-Phase One plants are appropriate. In 1990 the 
KWH (good output) of the test plants was slightly higher but not significantly different 
from that of the control plants. A comparison of S02 (bad output) production conveys a 
different story. In 1990, test firms produced over 5 million tons of S02 while control 
plants produced only 1.38 million. This difference is significant at the 0.0001 level. 
However, the variation in S02 does not appear to create a difference in production costs 
across plant type. Specifically, in 1990 there was not a significant difference in the 
production, fuel, or operating costs across the two groups. Thus, prior to the Act it 
appears that test plants were able to produce roughly the same level of good output and 
significantly more bad output without incurring a significant amount of additional cost. In 
fact, as noted in a comparison of the unit cost of good output production, the cost per 
kilo-watt hour for the test plants was significantly less than that of the control plants at 
the 0.005 level. 
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Panel B of Table 4 provides a comparison of Phase One and Non-Phase One 
plants in 1995. This period is important because it is the first year of Phase One. In 1995, 
there was no significant difference between nameplate capacities, which indicates that the 
matching criteria remained appropriate after intervention. During 1995, test and control 
plants produced the same level of good output. Moreover, no significant differences were 
reflected between the production, fuel, or operating costs of the two groups. At 2.8 
million tons, test plant S02 is significantly higher than the 1.4 million posted by the 
control plants. This difference is statistically significant at the 0.002 level. However, the 
variance in S02 production between the test and control plants in 1995 is less than that of 
1990. This reflects the effort made by Phase One plants to reduce pollution. Finally, even 
though test plants reduced pollution, they produced good output at a significantly lower 
unit level cost than control plants. 
Panel C of Table 4 provides a longitudinal analysis of the Phase One plants. 
Between 1990 and 1995 there was no statistical difference in good output production: 
However, as mandated by the 1990 CAAA, Phase One plants did post a significant 
reduction in bad output. Specifically, test plant S02 emissions went from 5.1 million tons 
in 1990 to about 2.8 million in 1995. This difference is statistically significant at the 
0.002 level. The constancy in good output and reduction in bad output were accompanied 
by cost reductions as total production cost went from an average of 83 to 54 million 
dollars. The difference between 1990 and 1995 production costs is significant at the 0.03 
level. Production cost reductions were primarily driven by significant declines in fuel 
costs, which, on average, decreased by 19 million dollars between 1990 and 1995. The 
difference in fuel costs between 1990 and 1995 is significant at the 0.02 level. Finally, the 
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reductions in fuel costs and pollution appeared to have a positive effect on the cost 
required to produce a kilo-watt of electricity (CKWH). This measure is important 
because it provides an indication of the per-unit cost of good output. As denoted, Phase 
One plants reduced CKWH from an average of0.023 in 1990 to 0.019 in 1995. This 
difference is significant at the 0.003 level. Taken together, all of these results appear to 
counter the traditional pollution control model's assumption that reducing pollution will 
cause either an increase in cost or a "reduction in good output. 
Panel D of Table 4 provides a time-varying analysis of the Non-Phase One Plants. 
The control plants did not post a significant change in good output between 1990 and 
1995 but did experience a significant decrease in production cost which was driven by 
fuel cost reductions. However, the economic gains posted by Non-Phase One plants were 
not accompanied by S02 reductions. In fact, although not significant, Non-Phase One 
plants actually increased S02 output from 1.37 to 1.39 million tons between 1990 and 
1995. 
6.2.1 Analysis of Production Costs 
Table 4 indicates that total production costs fell between 1990 and 1995 and that 
fuel cost reductions account for the majority of the decrease. There has been some 
analysis conducted on the change in production costs between the pre-Phase One and the 
Phase One periods. Knutson (1995) notes that the average production and fuel costs of 
the electric utility industry fell and will continue to fall as the industry persists in its 
efforts to find new ways to cut costs (Knutson, 1995, p. 13). Swift (2001) conducted an 
analysis of the change in production costs relative to the 1990 CAAA and makes several 
46 
observations. First, he argues that the changes in cost are directly attributable to the Act's 
focus on promoting innovative methods to reduce pollution. Further, he suggests the 
major drivers of lower costs in Phase One were innovation and increased efficiency. 
Finally, he suggests that the innovations implemented during this period take on one of 
two forms: 1) endogenous changes made directly to production processes; and 2) those 
created by parties outside of the electric utility industry in response to changes made by 
the plants. According to Swift (2001), these latter.innovations reflect a "spillover effect" 
whereby the innovations of one industry spur innovations in another industry. 
Innovations made during Phase One were significant. As estimated by Swift 
(2001), the Act promoted over $12 billion in innovative technologies designed to reduce 
pollution, improve fuel access and transportation, and eliminate waste (Swift, 2001, p. 
334 - 338). In the electricity industry, fuel represents the single highest production cost 
and thus, any production changes aimed at reducing this cost would have a significant 
impact. A significant amount of innovations that impacted production costs were those 
created to reduce fuel costs through the use of fuel blending (U.S. Department of Energy, 
Energy Information Administration, 1997, p. 5). Fuel blending involves the use of more 
than one type of fuel to produce electricity. In general, power plants are designed for a 
particular type of fuel and under traditional technologies, switching or blending fuels 
carries a high cost and could potentially reduce productivity (U.S. Department of Energy, 
Energy Information Administration, 1994, p. 13 -14). However, the 1990 CAAA lead to 
the experimentation and innovation of fuel blending techniques that removed these 
barriers and ultimately led to both the reduction of cost and pollution (Swift, 2001, p. 
336). 
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As Table 4 indicates, fuel costs reductions account for the majority of the 
production cost improvements of both the Phase One and the Non-Phase One plants. One 
of the reasons for this may be the blending of various coal types within plants. Coal is a 
major source of fuel used by the electric utility industry. It is also a major fuel source for 
the plants included in this study. 1 The delivered price of coal generally includes the mine 
price, transportation costs, and shipping and loading fees. The cost of coal declined 
between 1990 and 1995 [Swift (2001); U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information 
Administration (1994); U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration 
(1997)]. The decline in coal prices was directly attributable to fuel blending innovations 
because the use of cheaper and cleaner burning coal increased [U.S. Department of 
' 
Energy, Energy Information Administration (1994, p.13); Swift (2001, p. 336- 338)]. 
Moreover, the increase in the use of different types of coal created the opportunity for 
plants to renegotiate long-term fuel contracts and thus, introduce price competition [Swift 
(2001, p. 339); Hughes (2000, p. 213); U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information 
Administration (1997, p. 23)]. 
The effects of fuel blending extended beyond the electric utility industry. For 
instance, when faced with increased competition, coal producers developed new mining 
technologies. As a result, coal mining productivity rose by almost 7 percent between 
1990 and 1995 (U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 1997, 
p.23). A similar response occurred in the rail industry, which is the primary carrier of 
coal for the electric utility industry. Transportation costs are a significant portion of the 
1 The majority of the Phase One and a large portion of the Non-Phase One plants in this study listed some 
type of coal as their primary fuel source. Thus, it is appropriate to assume that both groups were affected by 
the changes in technology related to the use of coal as a fuel source. 
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average delivered cost of coal, accounting for over 31 percent of the average delivered 
price of contract coal (U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 
1997, p. 23). However, transportation costs related to coal purchases fell tremendously 
between the pre-Phase One and Phase One periods. Reasons suggested for this fall 
include the innovations made to improve rail car capacity and rail system infrastructures 
(Swift, 2001, p. 338). 
Thus, based on a preliminary investigation of the plant level data, it appears that 
the 1990 CAAA induced the electric utility industry and those associated with the 
industry to react. These reactions included both direct and indirect innovations that 
contributed to reductions in pollution and production costs, but did not negatively affect 
good output. Thus, it appears that both control and test plants benefited as the descriptive 
statistics indicate both groups significantly reduced costs. These results run counter to the 
traditional pollution control model and thus, provide some tentative support for the Porter 
Hypothesis and eco-efficiency. 
6.3 Efficiency Measure Distributions 
The DEA scores produced using Program Bare presented in Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
Tables 5 and 6 present the results when Phase One and Non-Phase One plants were 
pooled in 1990 and 1995 respectively. Table 7 presents the results when 1990 and 1995 
Phase One plants were pooled. Table 8 reflects the results when 1990 and 1995 Non-
Phase One plants were pooled. DEA scores are relative measures of performance that 
indicate how efficiently a plant uses the three inputs of nameplate capacity, fuel, and 
other operating inputs to produce the good output, kilo-watts hours of electricity. Thus, 
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they are measures of efficiency. These efficiency measures are bounded between zero 
and one, where one represents maximum efficiency. Therefore, at any point in time,· 
plants assigned a score of one are deemed the most efficient relative to others in the 
reference set and thus, are placed on the efficiency frontier. All other plants are deemed 
inefficient and fall within the interior. Finally, an increase in the score of an individual 
plant or a group of plants across time suggests that an improvement in efficiency has 
been made. 
The descriptive statistics and the distribution of the efficiency measures by deciles 
are presented in Table 9. Panel A of Table 9 provides a cross-sectional distribution of the 
efficiency scores of the pooled 1990 Phase One and Non-Phase One plants. In 1990, there 
were 16 plants on the efficiency frontier; nine related to Phase One and seven to Non-
Phase One. Further, it appears that the Phase One plants dominate the high-end deciles, 
while Non-Phase One plants dominate the low-end deciles. This pattern is reflected in the 
averages as well. Specifically, the 1990 plants were moderately efficient and averaged an 
overall efficiency of 0.68. The average efficiency of the Phase One plants was 0.71, 
implying that these plants were a driving force in the efficiency of the overall group 
efficiency in 1990. The Non-Phase One plants posted an average efficiency of only 0.65, 
which was below both overall and Phase One efficiencies. 
Panel B of Table 9 provides a cross-sectional analysis of the 1995 efficiency 
scores. After intervention, all three average efficiencies improved as overall efficiency 
averaged 0.69, while Phase One and Non-Phase One plants posted mean efficiencies of 
0.72 and 0.67 respectively. In addition, of the 17 plants placed on the efficiency frontier 8 
are Phase One. As with 1990, Phase One plant efficiency is higher than both the overall 
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average and Non-Phase One efficiency, suggesting that the 1995 Phase One plants 
dominate the high-end deciles. 
Panel C of Table 9 reflects the distribution of Phase One plant efficiency between 
1990 and 1995. The results reveal an overall pool mean efficiency of0.71, meaning that 
the inputs of the combined Phase One plants were 29 percent higher than they should 
have been. There also appears to be a difference in efficiency over time. Specifically, the 
1990 Phase One plants posted an average efficiency of 0.68. However, at 0.73 the 1995 
Phase One plants post a higher efficiency relative to both the overall and the 1990 plant 
average efficiencies. In terms of the deciles, the 1995 plants appear to moderately , 
dominate the high-end distributions, and 9 of the 17 most efficient plants in the pool 
relate to 1995. This is an important observation because during this same time period, 
Phase One plants were required to and did successfully reduce pollution. Traditional 
pollution control theories suggest that any reduction in pollution would have caused 
· either an increase in costs or a reduction in good output, either of which would have 
caused a reduction in efficiency. This outcome did not emerge and thus, there is some 
tentative support for the Porter Hypothesis and eco-efficiency. 
Results of the Non-Phase One plant efficiency distributions are presented in Panel 
D of Table 9. Nineteen plants are on the best practices frontier. The overall pool 
efficiency for the Non-Phase One plants was 0.65. Comparatively, the average of the 
1990 and 1995 Non-Phase One plants were 0.62 and 0.67 respectively. This suggests that 
relative to their 1990 counterparts, the 1995 Non-Phase One plants posted improvements. 
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6.4 Tests of the Malmquist Productivity Index 
The descriptive statistics of Table 4 and the efficiency measure distributions of 
Table 9 indicate the possibility that Phase One plants were able to create value at a lower 
cost through productivity improvements. An additional evaluation of the effect of the 
1990 CAAA on productivity over time is the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPD. The 
MPI measures the change in the productivity of a DMU between two time periods. One 
of the most important contributions of the MPI is that it can be multiplicatively 
decomposed into two parts: 1) an index that accounts for changes in technical efficiency 
(i.e., the catching-up effect); and 2) an index that accounts for shifts in the efficient 
frontier due to technological innovation (i.e., the frontier shift). When evaluating the MPI 
and its components, amounts greater than one indicate progress, while numbers smaller 
than one show regress. Amounts equal to one represent no change between the two 
periods. 
There are several benefits of using the MPI to analyze changes in Phase One and 
Non-Phase One plants between 1990 and 1995. First, it has been suggested that 
improving technical efficiency and creating innovations can reduce pollution, lower 
production costs and hence, improve performance within the electric utility industry. The 
overall MPI provides a direct approach to evaluating these claims. Second, the 
component indexes quantify the extent efficiency and innovations impact the overall 
change. Finally, a comparison of the MPI, catch-up, and frontier shift indexes of the 
Phase One and Non-Phase One plants can highlight whether significant differences in 
productivity exist across plant type and moreover, how efficiency and innovation 
contribute to such a variance. 
52 
Table 10 presents the MPI, efficiency, and technology indexes for the Phase One 
plants and Table 11 presents the same information relative to the Non-Phase One plants. 
As denoted in Table 10, the maximum and minimum MPI value for Phase One plants was 
1.998117 and 0.436665 respectively. Comparatively, the maximum and minimum MPI 
value for the Non-Phase One plants were 2.063284 and 0.28739 respectively. Further, it 
appears that the majority of the plants in both groups posted overall MPI improvements 
between 1990 and 1995. However, a comparison of all three indexes in both Tables 10 
and 11 suggests that the improvements in the MPI of the two groups were achieved 
differently. 
Table 12 provides summarized MPI, efficiency and technology data related to 
both Phase One and Non-Phase One plants. As denoted in Panel A of Table 12, over 75 
percent of the Phase One plants improve productivity between 1990 and 1995. A mean 
MPI of 1.139 reflects this progress. A one-sample t-test indicates that this progress is 
significantly different from 1 at the 0.0001 level. Panel A of Table 12 also shows that the 
majority of the Phase One plants took advantage of both efficiency and innovation to 
improve productivity. Specifically, at 1.003 the catch-up index indicates that most of the 
Phase One plants maintained or slightly increased efficiency between the pre-Phase One 
and the Phase One periods in spite of reducing pollution from 5.1 to 2.8 tons. In addition, 
over 96 percent of Phase One plants posted improvements related to frontier shifts. Thus, 
at 1.141, the frontier shift index of Phase One plants supports the claims that this group 
used innovations to move to a higher efficiency frontier to improve productivity. 
Panel B of Table 12 indicates that over 74 percent of the Non-Phase One plants 
improved productivity between 1990 and 1995 and that the overall MPI for the group was 
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1.204. A one-sample t-test indicates that this progress is significantly different from· 1 at 
the 0.0001 level. However, relatively few Non-Phase One plants improved because of 
enhanced efficiency. Specifically, less than 40 percent of the Non-Phase One plants had 
an individual efficiency index greater than unity. Thus, the mean catch-up index ofNon-
Phase One plants was 0.968, which reflects a regress in efficiency between 1990 and 
1995. Comparatively, the frontier shift index for Non-Phase One plants was 1.256. It 
appears that the Non-Phase One plants may have benefited from the Act as well, and that 
. this benefit is due to changes in innovation that spilled over to that group. 
6.4.1 Analysis of the Productivity Results 
The results in Table 12 suggest that both Phase One and Non-Phase One plants 
improved productivity between 1990 and 1995. However, while the productivity gains 
posted by the groups are similar, the reasons for, approaches to, and implications of these 
changes vary across plant type. The productivity gains posted by the Phase One plants are 
easily explained. The 1990 CAAA required Phase One plants to reduce pollution but did 
not mandate any specific method to reduce the pollution. Therefore, Phase One plants 
were free to develop and promote innovations that would reduce pollution in an efficient 
and cost effective manner. Based on the component indexes posted by the Phase One 
plants, it is obvious the group took advantage of this latitude by creating innovative 
approaches to reduce pollution reduction while at the same time at least maintain 
efficiency. These results are consistent with those presented in Panel C of Table 4, which 
shows that between 1990 and 1995 Phase One plants maintained good output and 
reduced production costs while simultaneously reducing pollution. Together, these results 
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suggest that the productivity of Phase One plants between the pre-Phase One and the 
Phase One periods was positively affected by efficiency and innovation. 
The ability of Phase One plants to maintain or post improvements in efficiency 
between the pre-Phase One and the P:P.ase One periods is particularly significant given 
these plants were required to reduce pollution. Traditional pollution control theory 
suggests that reducing pollution would require either an increase in costs or a reduction in 
good output, and that either of these reactions would cause a reduction in technical 
efficiency. There is no indication that this outcome occurred. In fact, in relation to their 
counterparts, Phase One plants performed no worse than Non-Phase One plants after 
intervention even though Phase One plants were required and did reduce their pollution. 
Comparatively, Non-Phase One plants were not required to reduce pollution until 
Phase Two. In fact, Non-Phase One plants actually increased pollution between the pre-
Phase One and Phase One periods. However, as Panel B of Table 12 indicates, Non-
Phase One plants significantly improved overall productivity between the pre-Phase One 
and the Phase One periods. Moreover, the component indexes ofMPI indicate Non-Phase 
One plants experienced a regress in efficiency and relied exclusively on frontier shifts to 
improve productivity. Thus, one possible and compelling explanation is that the 
improvement of Non-Phase One plants is the result of that group's capitalization of the 
technological innovations either directly created or spurred by Phase One plants. 
The ability of Non-Phase One plants to take advantage of industry innovations is 
referred to as a second mover advantage. A second mover advantage is the ability of a 
firm to benefit from the experiences of others who were either required to implement a 
technology or strategy early or chose to do so. Day and Montgomery (1983) advocate 
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that the presence of a second mover advantage in a technologically driven market occurs 
when followers end up with the same or lower costs than pioneers because they have the 
opportunity to learn from the pioneers' mistakes (Day and Montgomery, 1983, p. 48). 
Theoretical work suggests that this phenomenon is not uncommon. For instance, Lederer 
and Rhee (1995) show that early adopters have a competitive advantage only when 
competitors are slow to adopt technology. Further, they contend that when all firms are 
able to quickly respond to technological innovations and adopt them soon after they are 
introduced, returns on such investments are normal or have a zero net present value 
(Lederer and Rhee, 1995, p. 361 -362). Mohr (2002) provides a specific discussion of 
second mover advantage in relation to the Porter Hypothesis and environmental 
regulation. His theoretical model assumes that the introduction of a new technology 
created in response to an environmental regulation allows for the possibility that all firms 
can jointly increase long-term productivity. Thus, he suggests that firms can gain a 
second mover advantage if they wait for others to bear the short-term costs of adopting a 
technology (Mohr, 2002, p. 162 - 163). 
6.5 Test of Hypotheses 
The descriptive evidence presented thus far suggests that Phase One plants 
responded to the 1990 CAAA by reducing pollution. In addition, it appears that this 
group improved efficiency and adopted innovative technologies to improve productivity. 
Therefore, Phase One of the 1990 CAAA offers an attractive opportunity for a direct test 
of the validity of the Porter Hypothesis and its influence on the promotion of eco-efficient 
behavior. In order to determine this influence, a two-stage approach is adopted. In the 
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first stage the plant level DEA efficiency measures computed via Program B are used to 
determine whether traditional, pure eco-efficient, or regulation induced eco-efficient 
behavior is present prior to and after the intervention of the Act. This will provide some 
indication of how plants operated prior to intervention and whether intervention had an 
impact on subsequent behavior. In the second stage, regression Models 1 and 2 are used 
to empirically determine if the variation in the calculated efficiencies significantly relate 
to the intervention of the 1990 CAAA. 
6.5.1 Hypothesis One 
6.5.1.1 Results ofRank Sum Tests 
Hypothesis One addresses the impact of pollution on plant efficiency. This is 
done by pooling Phase One and Non-Phase One plants in both 1990 and 1995 to create 
DEA scores and then using rank sum tests to determine how the presence of pollution and 
efforts to reduce it affect efficiency. This test investigates whether the traditional or pure 
eco-efficient approach to pollution control exists prior to the Act and thus, pi:ovides a 
benchmark for those activities occurring after intervention. The null hypothesis 
pertaining to 1990 cross sectional efficiency assumes that Phase One plants are more 
efficient than Non-Phase One plants. Rejection of the null supports Hypothesis One. 
Subsequent to intervention, the Porter Hypothesis assumes that Phase One plants 
have been induced to adopt eco-efficient behavior. Therefore, Phase One plants should be 
more efficient than the Non-Phase One plants after intervention. However, if the 
traditional approach holds, then Phase One plants will become less efficient because they 
are required to reduce pollution. The Porter Hypothesis would project an opposite 
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outcome because it assumes that firms will be free to develop innovative ways to reduce 
pollution while reducing costs. Thus, the null hypothesis pertaining to 1995 cross 
sectional efficiency assumes that Non-Phase One plants are more efficient than Phase 
One plants. Therefore, rejection of the null will provide evidence that the Act stimulates 
eco-efficient behavior and will offer support for Hypothesis One. 
Table 13 reports the results of the 1990 and 1995 cross sectional analyses. In 
1990, the rank sum test reveals that at the 0.02 level of significance, the efficiency of 
Phase One plants is higher than that of the Non-Phase One plants. These results fail to 
reject the null hypothesis related to 1990 cross sectional efficiency and thus, do not 
provide support for Hypothesis One. These results can be interpreted as support that the 
traditional view of pollution control was in place in 1990. Therefore, these results can be 
used as a benchmark for analyzing the impact of intervention in 1995. 
In 1995, the rank sum test indicates that the efficiency of the Phase One plants is 
greater than the Non-Phase One plants at a 0.05 level of significance. Thus, these results 
reject the null hypothesis related to 1995 cross sectional relative efficiency and thus, 
provide support for Hypothesis One. While the tests suggest that Phase One plants were 
more efficient than their Non-Phase One counterparts in 1990 and 1995, the 1995 
outcome is especially important. Specifically, while cross sectional tests for both 1990 
and 1995 indicate Phase One plants are more efficient, the 1995 results emerge even after 
an intervening event required Phase One plants to reduce pollution. Thus, in 1995 Phase 
One plants maintained the dominance of Non-Phase One that they established in 1990 
plants even though the were required to and did reduce pollution. In addition, as 
evidenced in Panel B of Table 4, the Phase One plants had a significantly lower CKWH 
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than Non-Phase One plants, which also suggests that Phase One plants improved 
efficiency relative to the Non-Phase One plants after intervention. Thus, when all of these 
results are evaluated, there is evidence to suggest that the Act did promote eco-efficient 
behavior to the extent that plants affected did find ways to reduce pollution while at the 
same time reduced costs and at least maintained good output. 
6.5.2 Hypothesis Two 
6.5.2.1 Results of Rank Sum Tests 
Hypothesis Two addresses how the 1990 CAAA impacted plant efficiency over 
time. Plants were pooled by plant type and DEA scores were calculated for each plant 
type and used in the rank sum test to evaluate changes within the pool. The null 
hypothesis pertaining to Phase One plants assumes that they are more efficient in 1990 
than in 1995. Rejection of the null supports Hypothesis Two. The null hypothesis 
pertaining to Non-Phase One plants assumes that they are more efficient in 1995 than in 
1990. Rejection of the null supports Hypothesis Two. 
Table 14 reports the results of the Phase One and the Non-Phase One longitudinal 
rank sum tests. Tests reveal that at the 0.06 level of significance, the efficiency of the 
1995 Phase One plants is greater than the efficiency of the 1990 Phase One plants. 
Therefore, even after intervention the Phase One plants were able to improve their 
efficiency. This suggests that this group of plants was able to develop and implement 
techniques to reduce pollution and production costs while simultaneously at least 
maintaining the production of good output. Thus, the results reject the null hypothesis 
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relative to the longitudinal efficiency of Phase One plants and provide support for 
Hypothesis Two. 
The rank sum test of the Non-Phase One plants indicates that at the 0.11 level of 
significance, there is no difference between the efficiency of the 1990 and 1995 Non-
Phase One plants. This appears to indicate that the efficiency of the Non-Phase One 
plants remained relatively the same between 1990 and 1995. These results reject the null 
hypothesis that Non-Phase One plants improved efficiency between the pre-Phase One 
and the Phase One periods. This provides support for Hypothesis Two. 
Therefore, the results of the longitudinal rank sum tests provide solid evidence in 
support of Hypothesis Two along several dimensions. First, the results of the test of 
Phase One plants show that the group improved efficiency between 1990 and 1995 in 
spite of the fact that Phase One plants reduced S02 by more than 50 percent. Moreover, it 
appears that these gains were made through the use of both improvements in efficiency 
and the use of innovation. Finally, Phase One plant results are corroborated the Non-
Phase One plant results. Specifically, the longitudinal tests of the Non-Phase One plants 
indicate that their efficiency did not materially differ between 1990 and 1995. Thus, all of 
these results combine to suggest that plants can use efficiency and innovation to reduce 
pollution and production costs, while simultaneously maintaining good output. Therefore, 
there is direct evidence to support the Porter Hypothesis and eco-efficiency. 
6.5.2.2 Results of Regression Analysis 
Hypothesis Two is an interventionist hypothesis that assumes that the Act actually 
encouraged Phase One plants to become efficient. As denoted in Chapter 5, Model 1 is 
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used to estimate the relationship between efficiency and the Act. This is accomplished by 
regressing the efficiency scores of the pooled 1990 and 1995 Phase One plants on a proxy 
of intervention (EVENT) and two control variables (CLIM and STRICT). A similar 
regression is conducted for Non-Phase One plants. Positive and significant results for 
intervention for Phase One plants provide support for Hypothesis Two. Insignificant 
results for intervention for Non-Phase One plants also provide support for Hypothesis 
Two. 
As presented in Chapter 5, Model 2 is designed to measure the effect of 
intervention on efficiency when Phase One and Phase Two plants are evaluated together. 
Simultaneously regressing Phase One and Non-Phase One plant efficiencies on the 
intervention and conditioning variables, as well as the additional variable TYPE 
accomplishes this task. TYPE is included to account for any variation in efficiency 
related to plant type. Positive and significant results for the intervention and the type 
variable provide strong support for Hypothesis Two. 
Tables 15-17 show the coefficient matrices for the Phase One, Non-Phase One, 
and the combined groups. The data were examined for evidence of multicollinearity as its 
presence makes it difficult to obtain accurate estimates of the individual effects of the 
explanatory variables. All of the correlation coefficients between the explanatory 
variables are below 20 percent. Based on these results, multicollinearity is not considered 
a problem. The highest correlations in all Tables are between STRICT and CLIM. This 
type of relationship is expected given that both variables measure the restrictions imposed 
on a plant by the state in which it is located. No statistical relationship between STRICT 
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and EVENT is posted in Tables 15, 16, or 17. Additionally, no relationship between 
TYPE and EVENT is posted in Table 17. 
The evidence from Model 1 for Phase One plants is summarized in Panel A of 
Table 18. First, EVENT is positive and significant at the 0.06 level. This infers that 
intervention had a positive effect on the efficiency of Phase One plants. As expected, 
CLIM has a negative impact on efficiency. However, the impact is not significant at the 
0.45 level. STRICT is significant at the 0.004 level but has a negative impact, which is 
contrary to that expected. Together, these results suggest that plants affected by the 1990 
CAAAresponded by simultaneously reducing pollution and production costs while at 
least maintaining good output. This provides direct support for the Porter Hypothesis and 
eco-efficiency. Moreover, the efficiency of Phase One plants does not appear to be 
materially affected by how favorably state regulators approve requests for increased 
expenditures. However, contrary to expectations, the stringency of the environmental 
climate of the state in which a plant operates has a significant negative impact on 
efficiency. This may infer that states do not allow flexibility in pollution control and thus, 
may establish laws and regulations that add additional costs beyond those incurred to 
satisfy federal mandates. 
Panel B of Table 18 presents the regression results of the Non-Phase One plants. 
For this group, intervention is positive and significant at the 0.08 level. These results run 
counter to those expected. There are several possible reasons for this outcome. First, there 
is a clear indication that Non-Phase One plants made use of the second mover advantage 
to create improvements between 1990 and 1995. Specifically, the frontier shift index 
analysis in Panel B of Table 12 indicates that Non-Phase One plant productivity 
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improved between the pre-Phase One and the Phase One period because of shifts in the 
efficiency frontier created by innovations. However, because the frontier shift was so 
large, the Non-Phase One plants were able to post overall improvements in productivity 
between the two time periods. Thus, one can conclude that while intervention had a 
significant and positive impact on Non-Phase One plants, the progress is more a function 
of improvements that arose because of the actions taken by Phase One plants in reaction 
to the Act and not those initiated by the Non-Phase One plants themselves. With respect 
to the control variables, CLIM is the right sign but is not significant at the 0.17 level of 
significance. STRICT is negative and significant at the 0.02 level. Thus, the previous. 
discussion of the results related to CLIM and STRICT remain applicable. 
Model 2 results are presented in Panel C of Table 18. For the combined model, 
intervention is positive and significant at the 0.03 level. TYPE is positive and significant 
and the 0.0073 level. These results provide some additional insights about the 
relationship between efficiency and intervention. First, the results for intervention suggest 
continued support for the Porter Hypothesis. More importantly, when these results are 
combined with the favorable outcome of TYPE, there is evidence to infer that the 
efficiency improvements of the electric utility industry between the pre-Phase One and 
the Phase One periods were significantly related to Phase One plants. This provides 
strong and direct evidence for eco-efficiency and the Porter Hypothesis. As before, CLIM 
is the right sign but is not significant at the 0.26 level. Finally, STRICT is significant at 
the 0.0002 level but doesn't have the hypothesized sign. 
In summary, the regression results provide support for the Porter Hypothesis as 
Phase One and Non-Phase One plants were positively affected by the Act. This indicates 
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that environmental regulations can be used to improve efficiency while at the same time 
reduce pollution. However, while both types were positively affected, Phase One plants 
were impacted the most. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the Porter Hypothesis by investigating 
how endogenous changes made by utilities in response to Phase One of the 1990 CAAA 
affect productive efficiency. If the Porter Hypothesis is valid, then utilities subject to the 
1990 CAAA should engage in process improvement and process innovation, thus 
exhibiting an increase in productive efficiency relative to performance prior to the Act. 
Thus, the study had two objectives. First, it sought to find evidence to support the 
premise that pollution is a form of technical inefficiency. Second, it sought to determine 
whether a properly designed environmental regulation enacted to reduce pollution 
actually spurred improvements in efficiency. 
Tests conducted reveal that pollution is a form of technical inefficiency. Cross 
sectional rank sum tests indicate that prior to intervention, Phase One plants were more 
efficient even though they had higher levels of pollution. This outcome suggests that 
prior to the Act, Phase One plants may have actually used excessive pollution as a way to 
maintain efficiency relative to their Non-Phase One counterparts by passing the cost of 
their pollution to others. However, after intervention Phase One plants reduced pollution 
significantly and were more efficient than Non-Phase One plants who increased 
pollution. Longitudinal rank sum tests provide evidence to suggest that regulation can 
induce efficiency. Specifically, Phase One plants post an improvement between 1990 and 
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1995 even though they significantly reduced pollution during the same time. This 
outcome suggests that eliminating pollution does improve efficiency. This observation is 
corroborated by the results of Non-Phase One plant tests during the same period. Non-
Phase One plants were not required to reduce pollution. Tests reveal that these plants did 
not materially change pollution levels between 1990 and 1995 and that no statistical 
difference in efficiency existed between this time period. 
Regression results reveal that the Act was a determinant in the variation in 
efficiency between 1990 and 1995. Thus, there is evidence to support the claim that a 
properly designed regulation can induce changes that have a positive impact. However, 
both Phase One and Non-Phase One plants were significantly and positively affected by 
intervention. Additional analyses indicate that Phase One productivity was affected by 
both efficiency and innovation while Non-Phase One plants relied exclusively on 
innovations to post progress. Non-Phase One improvements indicate the presence a 
second mover advantage. Specifically, the innovations created by the Phase One plants 
may have indirectly produced benefits for the Non-Phase One because they were able to 
capitalize on these innovations. However, an analysis of the combined group indicates 
that the Act and the Phase One plant type significantly and positively affect the variation 
in efficiency between 1990 and 1995. All of these results provide direct support for the 
Porter Hypothesis and eco-efficiency. 
The implications of adopting innovation techniques have also been used as a 
possible explanation of why the market for pollution permits did not evolve as 
anticipated. One of the cornerstones of the Act was the emergence of pollution permits 
that could be traded. It was felt that these permits would contribute to cost reductions by 
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allowing a firm to either bank allowances or to trade them on the open market (Swift, 
2001, p. 341). However, one of the issues that surrounds these permits is their valuation. 
Indeed, as noted by Sansing and Strauss (1998), establishing a value for these permits is 
important when addressing how environmental policies can be combined with other 
regulatory tools mandated by the government. 
The results of investigating the cost of compliance before and after intervention 
can be used to explain how the value of these permits is achieved. For instance, it was 
anticipated that with the technology available prior to intervention, compliance costs 
would be high and, therefore, these costs would drive the price of permits to settle at 
around $1,500/ton (Hughes, 2000, p. 213). However, by 1992 compliance cost 
projections had been reduced from the initial estimate of $151 billion to just around $836 
million (U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 1997, p. 12). At 
the same time, permits were trading at around $265/ton (Hughes, 2000, p. 213). Hughes 
(2000) suggests that the cost of pollution permits were less than that projected during 
Phase One because oflower compliance costs (Hughes, 2000, p. 213). Hughes goes on to 
imply that the installation of innovative technologies allowed firms to over-comply with 
emission reduction requirements, which freed thousands of allowances for the market and 
drove permit prices down. An analysis by the Energy Information Administration goes 
further and suggests that because of the flexibility provided by the Act and the cost 
reductions created by its flexibility, permit prices became much lower (U.S. Department 
of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 1997, p. 46). 
The findings of this study are important because they can provide management 
with information that can be used to develop value-adding strategies on how to handle 
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pollution and regulations. They are especially important because they demonstrate these 
implications at the plant level where it is expected that any changes made in reaction to a 
regulation will initially surface. However, a noted criticism of pollution control studies is 
that they may not recognize the economic consequences of the interaction between the 
various governmental policies controlling firm activities (Freedman and Jaggi, 1994). For 
instance, a regulatory tool that the government uses to implement public policy is 
taxation. Sansing and Strauss (1998) suggest that tax policies should be evaluated in 
conjunction with pollution control regulations. Using a stylized model, they theoretically 
investigate how compliance with S02 emission standards could be affected by tax policy. 
Their :findings indicate that tax policies could undermine the efficiency of pollution 
control regulations. Therefore, a logical extension of this study would be to empirically 
investigate whether tax policies inhibit the ability of the 1990 CAAA to induce eco-
ef:ficient behavior. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES 
TABLE 1 
Sample of Phase One Plants with Available FERC Form 1 Data3 
Total Phase One Plantsb 
Plants Not Required to File a FERC Form 1 c 
Initial Set of Plants with FERC Form 1 Data 
Data Not Located in the FERC Form ld 
Data in FERC Form 1 was Unusablee 
Unable to Matchr 
Final Phase One Plants Usedg 
164 
..ill) 
139 
(15) 
(26) 
...(ill 
84 
a The data for the study are obtained from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Form 1 (FERC 
Form 1). Only major investor-owned electric utilities are required to submit a FERC Form 1. FERC Form 
1 submissions are required annually. Data presented in a FERC Form 1 include income and earnings, 
operating and maintenance expenses, and various production statistics. Plant level financial and operating 
data are located in the "Steam Generating Plant Statistics for Large Plants" section of the FERC Form 1. 
b Includes all of the electric utility plants affected by Phase One of Title IV of the 1990 CAAA. These 
plants are referred to as Phase One plants. Starting in 1995, the S02 emissions of Phase One plants were 
evaluated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to ensure that they are in compliance with the 
1990CAAA. 
c Includes those plants that are publicly-owned and thus, are not required to submit a FERC Form 1. 
Publicly-owned utilities are operated by (1) the federal government; (2) a state or local municipality; or 
(3) an electric cooperative. 
d Includes those Phase One plants whose "Steam Generating Plant Statistics For Large Plants" data were 
not included with the FERC Form 1 filed with the Commission. 
e Includes those Phase One plants whose "Steam Generating Plant Statistics For Large Plants" data filed in 
the FERC FORM 1 were incomplete. 
r Includes those Phase One plants that could not be matched with a control plant based on the criteria 
established. 
g Reflects the total number of Phase One Plants: (1) whose data is complete; (2) can be successfully with 
Non-Phase One plants. Thus, the grand total of the plants included in the study is 168 (i.e., 84 Phase One 
and 84 Non-Phase One). 
77 
TABLE2 
Total Sample Distribution by NERC Regiona 
NERC No. of No. of No.of 
Region Total Phase Non-Phase 
Sample One One 
Plants Plants Plants 
ECARb 52 26 26 
SERCC 28 14 14 
MAINd 26 13 13 
NPCCe 20 10 10 
sppf 20 10 10 
MACCg 16 8 8 
wscch 4 2 2 
MAPP 1 
-2 _1 _1 
Total Plants 168 84 84 
· a The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) region was used to match Phase One withNon-
Phase One plants. This table provides a distribution of the total sample (Phase One and Non-Phase One) 
by NERC region. The Council was formed in 1968 by the electric utility industry to promote the 
reliability and adequacy of bulk power supply in the electric systems of North America. There are nine 
regional reliability councils that encompass all the power of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 
With the exception of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), all NERC regions are 
represented in this study. 
b East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement 
c Southeastern Electric Reliability Council 
d Mid-America Interconnected Council 
eNortheast Power Coordinating Council 
r Southwest Power Pool 
g Mid-Atlantic Area Council 
h Western Systems Coordinating Council 
i Mid-Continent Area Power Pool 
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TABLE3 
Total Sample Distribution by Statea 
No. of No. of No.of 
Total Phase Non-Phase 
Sample One One 
State Plants Plants Plants 
Illinois d 17 8 9 
Indiana b 16 11 5 
New Yorke 15 7 8 
Pennsylvania g,b 13 7 6 
Florida c 12 3 9 
Georgia c 10 8 2 
Ohio b 10 8 2 
Missouri f,d 9 9 0 
Kentuckyb 8 3 5 
Wisconsin d 8 5 3 
Michigan b,d 8 0 8 
Virginia c,h, 6 1 5 
West Virginia b 5 2 3 
Oklahoma r 5 0 5 
Maryland g 4 2 2 
Louisiana r 3 0 3 
New Hampshire e 3 2 1 
California h 2 0 2 
Kansas r 2 1 1 
Mississippi c 2 2 0 
Wyomingh 2 2 0 
Arkansas c 1 0 1 
Connecticut e 1 0 1 
Delaware g 1 0 1 
Iowa i 1 0 1 
Massachusetts e 1 1 0 
Minnesota 1 1 1 0 
New Jerseyg 1 1 0 
South Carolina c _1 _Q _1 
Total Plants 168 84 84 
Total States 29 20 23 
a The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) regions were used to match Phase One with 
Non-Phase One plants. This table provides a distribution of the states included in this study and the 
NERC region(s) in which they reside. Twenty-nine states in eight regions are represented in this study. 
The regions associated with the states are: 
b East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement 
d Mid-America Interconnected Council 
r Southwest Power Pool 
h Western Systems Coordinating Council 
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c Southeastern Electric Reliability Council 
eNortheast Power Coordinating Council 
g Mid-Atlantic Area Council 
i Mid-Continent Area Power Pool 
TABLE4 
Summary and Descriptive Statistics for Phase One and Non-Phase One Plants3 
Panel A: Cross Sectional Analysis - 1990 Comparisons (n = 84) 
Part I: Total Unit Comparisons 
1990 1990 
Phase One Non-Phase One Net % 
Variable Plants Plants Diff Diff 
NPC 72407 73064 657 0.91 
KWH 332428 264437 (67991) (20.45) 
PC 6995 6837 (158) (2.26) 
FC 5467 5370 (97) (1.78) 
00 oc 1527 1467 (60) (3.96) 0 
CKWH 1.98 3.31 1.33 67.17 
POLL 5153797 1378377 (3775420) (72.26) 
Part II: Mean Unit Comparisons 
1990 Phase One Plants (n = 84) 1990 Non-Phase One Plants (n = 84) 
Std. Std. T Prob> 
Variable Mean Dev Min. Max. Mean Dev Min. Max. Statistic ill 
NPC 861.98 607.60 98 2600 869.81 613.93 83.50 2932 0.08 0.9339 
KWH 3957 3307 214 14559 3148 3084 13 16088 -1.64 0.1029 
PC 83 63 10 270 81 70 2 366 -0.18 0.8567 
FC 65 54 5 243 63 56 1 251 -0.13 0.8931 
oc 18 11 2 61 17 20 1 164 -0.28 0.7776 
CKWH 0.023 0.008 0.011 0.071 0.039 0.050 0.014 0.416 2.84*** 0.0056 
POLL 61354 68062 3259 365308 16409 29040 0 205662 -5.57** 0.0001 
TABLE 4 (continued) 
Panel B: Cross Sectional Analysis-1995 Comparisons (n = 84) 
Part I: Total Unit Comparisons 
1995 1995 
Variable Phase One Non-Phase One Net % 
Plants Plants Diff Diff 
NPC 71816 72557 741 1.03 
KWH 317387 266246 (51141) (16.11) 
PC 5331 5008 (323) (6.06) 
FC 3907 3835 (72) (1.84) 
oc 1424 1172 (252) (17.70) 
00 CKWH 1.66 2.21 0.55 33.13 
- POLL 2810175 1397005 (1413170) (50.29) 
Part II: Mean Unit Comparisons 
1995 Phase One Plants (n = 84) 1995 Non-Phase One Plants (n = 84) 
Std. Std. T Prob> 
Variable Mean Dev Min. Max. Mean Dev Min. Max. Statistic ITl 
NPC 854.96 614.16 98 2600 863.77 614.14 108 2932 0.09 0.9260 
KWH 3778 3573 112 14806 3169 2984 46 17772 -1.20 0.2324 
PC 63 54 4 286 59 48 3 303 -0.48 0.6305 
FC 46 42 1 199 45 36 1 162 -0.14 0.8892 
oc 16 14 2 87 13 16 1 140 -1.27 0.2076 
CKWH 0.019 0.007 0.009 0.045 0.026 0.022 0.008 0.183 2.46**** 0.0157 
POLL 33454 40824 6 252365 16631 27285 0 186399 -3.14** 0.0020 
TABLE 4 (continued) 
Panel C: LongUudinal Analysis -Phase One Plants (n = 84) 
Part I: Total Unit Comparisons 
1990 1995 
Phase One Phase One Net % 
Variable Plants Plants Diff Diff 
NPC 72407 71816 (591) . (0.82) 
KWH 332428 317387 (15041) (4.52) 
PC 6995 5331 (1664) (23.79) 
FC 5467 3907 (1560) (28.53) 
oc 1527 1424 (103) (6.75) 
CKWH 1.98 1.66 (0.32) (16.16) 
00 POLL 5153797 2810175 (2343622) (45.47) 
N 
Part Il: Mean Unit Comparisons 
1990 Phase One Plants (n = 84) 1995 Phase One Plants (n = 84) 
Std. Std. T Prob> 
Variable Mean Dev Min. Max. Mean Dev Min. Max. Statistic ill 
NPC 861.98 607.60 98 2600 854.96 614.16 98 2600 0.07 0.9407 
KWH 3957 3307 214 14559 3778 3573 112 14806 0.34 0.7365 
PC 83 63 10 270 63 54 4 286 2.l6**** 0.0322 
FC 65 54 5 243 46 42 1 199 2.45**** 0.0154 
oc 18 11 2 61 16 14 2 87 0.61 0.5397 
CKWH 0.023 0.008 0.011 0.071 0.019 0.007 0.009 0.045 3.07* 0.0025 
POLL 61354 68062 3259 365308 33454 40824 6 252365 3.22* 0.0016 
TABLE 4 (continued) 
Panel D: Longitudinal Analysis - Non-Phase One Plants (n = 84) 
Part I: Total Unit Comparisons 
1990 1995 
Variable Non-Phase One Non-Phase One Net O/o 
Plants Plants Diff Diff 
NPC 73064 72557 (507) (0.69) 
KWH 264437 266246 1809 0.68 
PC 6837 5008 (1829) (26.75) 
FC 5370 3835 (1535) (28.58) 
oc 1467 1172 (295) (20.11) 
CKWH 3.31 2.21 (1.10) (33.23) 
00 
w POLL 1378377 1397005 18628 1.35 
Part II: Mean Unit Comparisons 
1990 Non-Phase One Plants (n = 84) 1995 Non-Phase One Plants (n = 84) 
Std. Std. T Prob> 
Variable Mean Dev Min. Max. Mean Dev Min. Max. Statistic lil 
NPC 869.81 613.93 83.50 2932 863.77 614.14 108 2932 0.06 0.9493 
KWH 3148 3084 13 16088 3169 2984 46 17772 -0.05 0.9634 
PC 81 70 2 366 59 48 3 303 2.33**** 0.0211 
FC 63 56 1 251 45 36 1 162 2.48**** 0.0142 
oc 17 20 1 164 13 16 1 140 1.24 0.2174 
CKWH 0.039 0.050 0.014 0.416 0.026 0.022 0.008 0.183 2.17*** 0.0322 
POLL 16409 29040 0 205662 16631 27285 0 186399 -0.05 0.9594 
TABLE 4 (continued) 
a This table reports selected summary level plant data an descriptive and statistics for the sample plants on: ( 1) a cross-sectional (between ) plant type basis; and 
(2) a longitudinal (within) plant type basis. Part One of this Table provides a comparison of the unit level activity of plants. Part Two reflects the mean of those 
activities as a well as the results of tests of the difference in the means. All statistics (i.e., maximum, minimum) are based on single year means. All p-values 
relate to a two-sided test where* p < 0.005, ** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, and**** p < 0.05. The variable definitions: 
NPC = The nameplate generating capacity is the full-load capacity rating of a plant to continuously produce electricity. Table amounts are presented as 
millions of watts capacity. 
KWH = The kilowatt per hour of electricity generated. A watthour (Wh) is an electrical energy unit of measure equal to 1 watt of power supplied to an electric 
circuit steadily for an hour. Thus, KWH represents one thousand watthours. Table amounts are presented as millions of KWH. 
PC = The total production costs incurred to produce electricity as defined by the accounting requirements of the Operation and Maintenance Expense 
Accounts of the FERC Uniform System of Accounts. Production costs are generally decomposed into two components: (1) fuel costs; and (2) all other 
operating costs. Because of inflation, nominal prices from different years cannot be compared without making some adjustments. Thus, the Consumer 
Price Index is used to deflate 1995 to 1990 prices. Table amounts are presented in millions of dollars. 
FC = The costs associated with the purchase, handling, and storage of the fuel burned to produce electricity. These costs are the largest and most variable 
item on a utility's list of production expenses. Because of inflation, nominal prices from different years cannot be compared without making some 
adjustments. Thus, the Consumer Price Index is used to deflate 1995 to 1990 prices. Table amounts are presented in millions of dollars. 
~ OC = The operating costs incurred to produce electricity. These costs include labor and other expenses related to operating and maintaining a plant. 
Because of inflation, nominal prices from different years cannot be compared without making some adjustments. Thus, the Consumer Price Index is 
used to deflate 1995 to 1990 prices. Table amounts are presented in millions of dollars. 
CKWH = The cost per kilowatt hour. 
POLL = The amount of S02 pollution (i.e., bad output) created when good output (KWH) is produced. Table amounts are presented in tons. 
TABLES 
1990 Cross Sectional DEA Scores-Phase One and Non-Phase One Plants (n = 168)8 
DEA DEA DEA DEA 
Plant Score Plant Score Plant Score Plant Score 
NP0-03 1 P0-60 0.818604 NP0-69 0.673732 NP0-58 0.549753 
NP0-14 1 NP0-07 0.815684 P0-47 0.670449 NP0-43 0.547782 
NP0-18 1 NP0-37 0.810494 P0-30 0.669502 NP0-31 0.544256 
NP0-40 1 P0-76 0.805899 P0-32 0.667319 P0-78 0.53478 
NP0-55 1 P0-08 0.801139 P0-63 0.662074 NP0-85 0.531145 
NP0-61 1 NP0-63 0.800779 NP0-32 0.661927 P0-59 0.529372 
NP0-68 1 NP0-48 0.796831 NP0-62 0.660411 NP0-59 0.526684 
P0-03 1 NP0-02 0.796067 P0-24 0.657238 NP0-24 0.525934 
P0-23 1 NP0-26 0.791251 P0-21 0.653897 P0-14 0.522985 
P0-36 1 P0-68 0.791014 P0-52 0.650439 P0-20 0.519636 
P0-40 1 NP0-42 0.784866 NP0-45 0.647357 P0-18 0.506282 
P0-42 1 P0-80 0.784271 P0-73 0.644146 P0-02 0.505418 
P0-64 1 NP0-67 0.782949 NP0-34 0.642362 NP0-72 0.504343 
00 P0-67 1 NP0-65 0.777706 P0-26 0.641667 NP0-16 0.502 V, 
P0-85 1 NP0-46 0.776658 P0-37 0.639261 NP0-28 0.501682 
P0-86 1 NP0-33 0.767665 NP0-60 0.637656 P0-53 0.495975 
NP0-36 0.996157 P0-54 0.763582 NP0-04 0.637109 NP0-27 0.490782 
NP0-64 0.996121 P0-34 0.75932 P0-72 0.634463 NP0-86 0.489902 
NP0-35 0.987356 P0-41 0.759079 NP0-77 0.634381 NP0-41 0.471176 
P0-28 0.986298 NP0-22 0.758498 P0-58 0.629334 P0-15 0.466945 
NP0-29 0.973607 P0-16 0.758082 P0-31 0.629268 P0-50 0.464643 
NP0-57 0.95976 P0-01 0.753439 P0-65 0.62774 NP0-74 0.459459 
P0-33 0.938478 P0-43 0.752125 NP0-56 0.627191 NP0-38 0.448724 
P0-57 0.929296 P0-38 0.747275 NP0-15 0.62511 NP0-01 0.436509 
NP0-82 0.929204 P0-75 0.74716 P0-29 0.619449 NP0-50 0.424441 
NP0-71 0.928452 NP0-39 0.746991 P0-09 0.615248 NP0-49 0.422489 
P0-69 0.927042 NP0-81 0.743243 P0-79 0.613832 NP0-84 0.417248 
P0-82 0.893329 P0-70 0.742026 NP0-08 0.604963 NP0-10 0.41195 
NP0-79 0.873181 NP0-51 0.739161 NP0-44 0.602591 P0-77 0.409375 
NP0-66 0.862678 P0-51 o.723095 P0-48 0.602329 P0-44 0.37846 
P0-35 0;859353 P0-62 0.713047 NP0-53 0.596306 NP0-75 0.340647 
P0-84 0.858185 P0-61 0.708191 .P0-27 0.595802 NP0-13 0.337114 
P0-22 0.855152 P0-46 0.704263 P0-39 0.594147 NP0-78 0.32577 
00 
O'I 
DEA DEA DEA DEA 
Plant Score Plant Score Plant Score Plant Score 
NP0-30 0.853549 P0-45 0.696177 P0-06 0.5939 NP0-76 0.321759 
P0-81 0.843922 NP0-11 0.691469 NP0-47 0.592767 NP0-80 0.301022 
P0-07 0.836654 P0-49 0.686765 NP0-25 0.590121 NP0-73 0.299072 
P0-10 0.833021 NP0-06 0.684554 NP0-21 0.581247 NP0-54 0.298552 
P0-66 0.831735 P0-25 0.684345 P0-17 0.57927 P0-71 0.270512 
NP0-23 0.827953 P0-13 0.682835 NP0-05 0.578879 NP0-17 0.266033 
P0-74 0.827032 P0-11 0.678745 P0-04 0.57717 NP0-19 0.261278 
P0-56 0.820378 NP0-09 0.675936 P0-05 0.57 NP0-20 0.253509 
P0-55 0.820117 NP0-52 0.674825 P0-19 0.569431 NP0-70 0.251576 
a This table reports the cross sectional DEA scores for the Phase One (PO) and Non-Phase One (NPO) plants for 1990. DEA Score are bound between zero and 
one. Thus, the maximum DEA score is equal to one. The table contents are presented in descending DEA score order. 
TABLE6 
1995 Cross Sectional DEA Scores - Phase One and Non-Phase One Plants (n = 168)3 
DEA DEA DEA DEA 
Plant Score Plant Score Plant Score Plant Score 
NP0-03 1 P0-80 0.858943 P0-61 0.682714 P0-52 0.554835 
NP0-09 1 NP0-06 0.855769 NP0-72 0.682026 P0-15 0.554751 
NP0-14 1 P0-76 0.851435 P0-39 0.681129 NP0-25 0.551612 
NP0-36 1 P0-32 0.844618 NP0-24 0.679456 P0-18 0.53578 
NP0-40 1 P0-68 0.84456 NP0-11 0.674921 NP0-51 0.530669 
NP0-44 1 NP0-82 0.842386 P0-21 0.670514 P0-65 0.529192 
NP0-48 1 P0-74 0.839055 P0-24 0.669727 P0-11 0.51306 
NP0-68 1 P0-13 0.835351 P0-19 0.665646 P0-77 0.51077 
NP0-79 1 P0-07 0.830078 P0-34 0.66486 NP0-59 0.507303 
P0-03 1 NP0-47 0.828009 NP0-39 0.660469 NP0-84 0.502163 
P0-23 1 NP0-29 0.826392 P0-48 0.655854 NP0-38 0.501184 
P0-36 1 NP0-04 0.824089 NP0-15 0.653331 P0-09 0.498944 
P0-40 1 NP0-37 0.821632 P0-26 0.644037 NP0-08 0.49583 
P0-62 1 P0-51 0.821614 NP0-27 0.642416 NP0-17 0.494113 00 P0-67 1 NP0-32 0.817739 NP0-45 0.636635 P0-58 0.488903 -....,l 
P0-85 1 P0-55 0.81164 NP0-31 0.619017 NP0-76 0.48578 
P0-86 1 P0-75 0.799 NP0-05 0.618031 NP0-01 0.484085 
P0-42 0.996585 NP0-56 0.792475 NP0-23 0.617347 NP0-50 0.478647 
P0-82 0.978624 P0-47 0.791343 P0-27 0.615034 NP0-19 0.477499 
NP0-64 0.968032 P0-64 0.789061 P0-54 0.614105 NP0-86 0.476382 
P0-84 0.965586 P0-16 0.786828 P0-31 0.609289 P0-17 0.475661 
NP0-22 0.963979 P0-41 0.777572 NP0-16 0.603477 NP0-61 0.475005 
NP0-55 0.961199 P0-25 0.777154 P0-37 0.602777 P0-44 0.474031 
NP0-41 0.955612 P0-38 0.77453 P0-49 0.588184 NP0-75 0.456943 
P0-63 0.935258 NP0-71 0.770314 NP0-46 0.588066 NP0-43 0.456903 
NP0-33 0.928305 NP0-57 0.768475 NP0-52 0.58659 P0-14 0.44682 
P0-28 0.925 P0-66 0.766237 P0-04 0.581731 P0-05 0.434646 
NP0-63 0.921177 P0-46 0.764405 NP0-28 0.581182 P0-02 0.421866 
NP0-67 0.918065 P0-72 0.740615 P0-20 0.580388 NP0-10 0.410681 
NP0-35 0.902269 P0-10 0.731218 P0-73 0.576975 NP0-49 0.409936 
NP0-30 0.902139 NP0-69 0.729316 NP0-02 0.576863 P0-59 0.408826 
P0-33 0.890751 NP0-65 0.725424 NP0-26 0.575856 NP0-70 0.399836 
P0-01 0.890652 P0-69 0.717864 NP0-62 0.574293 NP0-13 0.399139 
00 
00 
DEA DEA DEA DEA 
Plant Score Plant Score Plant Score. Plant Score 
P0-56 0.889142 P0-08 0.710853 P0-06 0.570838 NP0-20 0.395407 
NP0-66 0.886351 P0-70 0.706248 P0-50 0.570338 NP0-80 0.386417 
NP0-81 0.884722 NP0-07 0.699961 NP0-74 0.56865 P0-60 0.379199 
P0-35 0.880678 P0-78 0.697904 P0-30 0.567065 NP0-85 0.373464 
P0-81 0.873955 NP0-34 0.69646 NP0-73 0.563147 NP0-60 0.361058 
NP0-18 0.866459 P0-29 0.695448 NP0-42 0.563057 NP0-58 0.347957 
P0-43 0.865356 NP0-77 0.695117 P0-53 0.562295 NP0-54 0.340432 
P0-57 0.863871 P0-79 0.690798 NP0-53 0.558212 NP0-78 0.311013 
P0-22 0.860805 P0-45 0.686503 NP0-21 0.558123 P0-71 0.260754 
a This table reports the cross sectional DEA scores for the Phase One (PO) and Non-Phase One (NPO) plants for 1995. DEA Score are bound between zero and 
one. Thus, the maximum DEA score is equal to one. The table contents are presented in descending DEA score order. 
TABLE7 
Longitudinal DEA Scores -1990 verses 1995 Phase One Plants (n = 168)8 
DEA DEA DEA DEA 
Plant Score Plant Score Plant Score Plant Score 
P0-90-03 1 P0-95-57 0.847602 P0-90-46 0.694786 P0-95-50 0.571578 
P0-90-23 1 P0-95-38 0.847393 P0-95-79 0.691942 P0-95-30 0.568694 
P0-90-36 1 P0-90-07 0.846024 P0-95-78 0.691466 P0-95-52 0.568277 
P0-90-40 1 P0-95-68 0.842412 P0-95-45 0.690374 P0-90-27 0.565939 
P0-90-64 1 P0-95-74 0.840649 P0-90-43 0.68685 P0-90-05 0.565888 
P0-90-67 1 P0-95-07 0.830346 P0-90-34 0.682341 P0-95-53 0.562625 
P0-90-85 1 P0-90-55 0.824362 P0-95-39 0.680476 P0-90-45 0.561074 
P0-90-86 1 P0-95-76 0.822153 P0-90-62 0.676693 P0-90-48 0.553975 
P0-95-03 1 P0-90-56 0.820378 P0-90-11 0.675949 P0-90-72 0.552748 
P0-95-22 1 P0-95-55 0.815454 P0-95-61 0.674805 P0-95-18 0.552302 
P0-95-23 1 P0-90-28 0.813736 P0-95-15 0.672931 P0-90-26 0.544035 
P0-95-36 1 P0-90-10 0.813243 P0-90-30 0.667766 P0-90-29 0.538474 
P0-95-40 1 P0-90-08 0.805036 P0-95-19 0.667234 P0-90-19 0.538203 
00 P0-95-42 1 P0-95-47 0.801323 P0-90-49 0.665408 P0-95-58 0.533104 I.O 
P0-95-67 1 P0-90-74 0.798001 P0-90-52 0.661986 P0-90-59 0.531114 
P0-95-85 1 P0-95-10 0.797705 P0-90-25 0,660328 P0-95-65 0.530977 
P0-95-86 1 P0-95-51 0.797178 P0-90-47 0.65836 P0-90-79 0.529364 
P0-95-82 0.992346 P0-90-80 0.790284 P0-95-26 0.658021 P0-90-39 0.522278 
P0-95-32 0.989188 P0-95-16 0.786187 P0-95-48 0.657469 P0-90-17 0.520931 
P0-95-28 0.985557 P0-95-75 0.778845 P0-95-21 0.653927 P0-95-11 0.514633 
P0-95-62 0.968837 P0-95-41 0.778317 P0-95-27 0.650623 P0-95-77 0.508429 
P0-90-42 0.957537 P0-95-25 0.778198 P0-90-63 0.646324 P0-95-09 0.507964 
P0-95-84 0.944998 P0-90-81 0.776951 P0-95-54 0.638349 P0-90-78 0.507184 
P0-95-63 0.936454 P0-90-54 0.772234 P0-90-41 0.627113 P0-90-31 0.495772 
P0-90-57 0.932274 P0-95-64 0.766673 P0-90-58 0.626787 P0-95-17 0.476279 
P0-90-60 0.916651 P0-95-66 0.763697 P0-90-65 0.619353 P0-95-44 0.474461 
P0-90-76 0.916474 P0-90-16 0.760554 P0-90-13 0.61698 P0-90-53 0.471207 
P0-95-13 0.910999 P0-90-01 0.753439 P0-95-31 0.610389 P0-90-02 0.459596 
P0-90-33 0.900944 P0-90-75 0.74822 P0-90-73 0.603993 P0-90-20 0.457253 
P0-90-69 0.899241 P0-90-38 0.746254 P0-95-37 0.599462 P0-90-14 0.457081 
P0-95-81 0.895599 P0-90-70 0.744482 P0-90-09 0.595786 P0-95-14 0.449691 
P0-95-43 0.893933 P0-95-24 0.743051 P0-90-24 0.595095 P0-90-15 0.447032 
P0-95-33 0.89289 P0-95-72 0.740858 P0-90-37 0.594378 P0-95-05 0.435538 
IO 
0 
DEA DEA DEA DEA 
Plant Score Plant Score Plant Score Plant Score 
P0-90-82 0.890799 P0-90-68 0.73552 P0-95-06 0.591146 P0-95-60 0.434892 
P0-95-56 0.877364 P0-90-66 0.734127 P0-90-04 0.590433 P0-90-18 0.427388 
P0-95-35 0.862073 P0-90-51 0.730054 P0-95-49 0.589789 P0-95-02 0.422163 
P0-95-01 0.861044 P0-95-69 0.713499 P0-90-06 0.589371 P0-90-50 0.403092 
P0-90-35 0.860203 P0-95-08 0.711493 P0-95-20 0.586446 P0-95-59 0.400919 
P0-90-84 0.858185 P0-90-61 0.710719 P0-95-04 0.582095 P0-90-77 0.396718 
P0-90-22 0.85496· P0-95-70 0.709325 P0-90-32 0.578906 P0-90-44 0.308048 
P0-95-46 0.851927 P0-95-34 0.70541 P0-95-73 0.578622 P0-95-71 0.282237 
P0-95-80 0.851405 P0-95-29 0.70041 P0-90-21 0.577659 P0-90-71 0.217221 
a This table reports the longitudinal DEA scores for the Phase One (PO) plants for 1990 (90) and 1995 (95). DEA Score are bound between zero and one. Thus, 
the maximum DEA score is equal to one. The table contents are presented in descending DEA score order. 
TABLES 
Longitudinal DEA Scores-1990 verses 1995 Non-Phase One Plants (n = 168t 
DEA DEA DEA DEA 
Plant Score Plant Score Plant Score Pla:nt Score 
NP0-90-03 1 NP0-95-63 0.817877 NP0-95-73 0.621425 NP0-95-86 0.485507 
NP0-90-14 1 NP0-90-07 0.815684 NP0-95-31 0.619904 NP0-95-01 0.482929 
NP0-90-18 1 NP0-90-67 0.808578 NP0-90-60 0.613134 NP0-90-31 0.481393 
NP0-90-36 1 NP0-95-32 0.802944 NP0-90-62 0.612462 NP0-90-47 0.478827 
NP0-90-55 1 NP0-95-47 0.801759 NP0-95-53 0.610385 NP0-95-19 0.478797 
NP0-90-57 1 NP0-90-33 0.799885 NP0-90-53 0.606677 NP0-90-28 0.474799 
NP0-90-61 1 NP0-90-35 0.798371 NP0-95-52 0.603224 NP0-95-50 0.47399 
NP0-90-64 1 NP0-90-26 0.796099 NP0-90-08 0.60132 NP0-90-74 0.461196 
NP0-90-71 1 NP0-90-23 0.793395 NP0-95-16 0.593213 NP0-95-43 0.45667 
NP0-95-03 1 NP0-95-57 0.79303 NP0-95-74 0.590962 NP0-90-41 0.439953 
NP0-95-09 1 NP0-90-02 0.792117 NP0-90-05 0.58795 NP0-90-72 0.435299 
NP0-95-14 1 NP0-90-63 0.780334 NP0-90-15 0.586547 NP0-90-38 0.430722 
NP0-95-36 1 NP0-90-81 0.779295 NP0-90-58 0.58488 NP0-95-61 0.4296.69 
NP0-95-40 1 NP0-90-51 0.769466 NP0-95-72 0.58452 NP0-95-80 0.426029 
I.O NP0-95-44 1 NP0-95-69 0.756382 NP0-95-28 0.582869 NP0-95-20 0.424458 ..... 
NP0-95-48 1 NP0-95-56 0.750842 NP0-95-02 0.580914 NP0-95-70 0.421302 
NP0-95-64 1 NP0-90-39 0.749281 NP0-95-46 0.57783 NP0-95-10 0.410311 
NP0-95-68 1 NP0-95-77 0.736165 NP0-95-62 0.577421 NP0-95-49 0.409876 
NP0-95-79 1 NP0-90-48 0.732059 NP0-90-46 0.57409 NP0-95-75 0.408333 
NP0-95-55 0.978601 NP0-95-65 0.725424 NP0-90-21 0.573861 NP0-95-13 0.399139 
NP0-95-22 0.974982 NP0-95-24 0.708234 NP0-95-45 0.572175 NP0-90-01 0.398364 
NP0-95-30 0.97409 NP0-95-07 0.699961 NP0-95-21 0.570856 NP0-90-49 0.388992 
NP0-95-41 0.955612 NP0-95-34 0.698974 NP0-95-42 0.562957 NP0-95-60 0.387214 
NP0-90-29 0.952614 NP0-90-52 0.691894 NP0-90-86 0.561461 NP0-95-85 0.3695 
NP0-95-66 0.944353 NP0-90-42 0.687702 NP0-95-25 0.555546 NP0-90-43 0.368499 
NP0-95-35 0.943887 NP0-90-09 0.685517 NP0-90-59 0.554071 NP0-90-10 0.364937 
NP0-95-81 0.934572 NP0-90-06 0.6788 NP0-95-59 0.553735 NP0-90-78 0.353896 
NP0-95-33 0.93451 NP0-90-22 0.678359 NP0-90-85 0.543717 NP0-95-58 0.347799 
NP0-90-30 0.920958 NP0-95-11 0.67699 NP0-90-34 0.542737 NP0-90-75 0.345569 
NP0-90-40 0.913563 NP0-90-11 0.671582 NP0-90-25 0.542425 NP0-90-50 0.344838 
NP0-90-68 0.90139 NP0-90-32 0.671071 NP0-90-24 0.535818 NP0-90-84 0.333145 
NP0-90-66 0.884359 NP0-90-65 0.669813 NP0-95-51 0.535589 NP0-95-78 0.328273 
NP0-90-82 0.876576 NP0-95-15 0.667969 NP0-90-45 0.535413 NP0-90-13 0.317786 
\0 
N 
DEA DEA DEA DEA 
Plant Score Plant Score Plant Score Plant Score 
NP0-95-67 0.870239 NP0-90-04 0.662318 NP0-95-18 0.534987 NP0-95-54 0.317355 
NP0-95-06 0.867829 NP0-90-69 0.660522 NP0-90-44 0.521817 NP0-90-73 0.316924 
NP0-95-82 0.862085 NP0-95-27 0.651571 NP0-95-76 0.519045 NP0-90-76 0.314434 
NP0-95-37 0.850187 NP0-90-56 0.647462 NP0-95-08 0.515932 NP0-90-54 0.287376 
NP0-95-71 0.846727 NP0-95-39 0.639781 NP0-90-16 0.505758 NP0-90-80 0.286691 
NP0-90-79 0.841932 NP0-90-77 0.638829 NP0-95-38 0.503007 NP0-90-20 0.251223 
NP0-95-29 0.832277 NP0-95-26 0.632357 NP0-95-17 0.500121 NP0-90-19 0.249323 
NP0-95-04 0.831824 NP0-95-05 0.63078 NP0-90-27 0.49323 NP0-90-17 0.247433 
NP0-90-37 0.830956 NP0-95-23 0.62308 NP0-95-84 0.492595 NP0-90-70 0.234609 
a This table reports the longitudinal DEA scores for the Non-Phase One (NPO) plants for 1990 (90) and 1995 (95). DEA Score are bound between zero and one. 
Thus, the maximum DEA score is equal to one. The table contents are presented in descending DEA score order. 
TABLE9 
Frequencies and Summary Statistics of DEA Scores3 
Panel A: Cross Sectional Analysis - 1990 Comparisons 
1990 
Total 1990 Non-Phase 
Sample Phase One One 
Plant Plant Plant 
Efficiency Score Ranges Distribution Distribution Distribution 
1.00 16 9 7 
0.90-0.99 11 4 7 
0.80-0.89 21 14 7 
0.70-'- 0.79 27 15 12 
0.60-0.69 39 23 16 
0.50-0.59 27 13 14 
0.40-0.49 14 4 10 
0.30-0.39 6 1 5 
0.20-0.29 7 1 6 
N 168 84 84 
Mean 0.68 0.71 0.65 
Standard Deviation 0.19 0.16 0.21 
Minimum 0.25 0.27 0.25 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Panel B: Cross Sectional Analysis-1995 Comparisons 
Total 1995 1995 
Sample Phase One Non-Phase 
Plant Plant One 
Efficiency Score Ranges Distribution Distribution Distribution 
1.00 17 8 9 
0.90-0.99 14 5 9 
0.80-0.89 27 17 10 
0.70-0.79 19 14 5 
0.60-0.69 30 16 14 
0.50-0.59 30 14 16 
0.40-0.49 20 8 12 
0.30-0.39 10 1 9 
0.20-0.29 1 1 0 
N 168 84 84 
Mean 0.69 0.72 0.67 
Standard Deviation 0.19 0.17 0.20 
Minimum 0.26 0.26 0.31 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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TABLE 9 (continued) 
Panel C: Longitudinal Analysis - Phase One Plant Comparisons 
Total 1990 1995 
Sample Phase One Phase One 
Plant Plant Plant 
Efficiency Score Range Distribution Distribution Distribution 
r 
1.00 17 8 9 
0.90-0.99 12 5 7 
0.80-0.89 27 11 16 
0.70-0.79 28 13 15 
0.60-0.69 29 16 13 
0.50-0.59 36 20 16 
0.40-0.49 15 8 7 
0.30-0.39 2 2 0 
0.20-0.29 2 1 1 
N 168 84 84 
Mean 0.71. 0.68 0.73 
Standard Deviation 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Minimum 0.21 0.21 0.28 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Panel D: Longitudinal Analysis - Non-Phase One Plant Comparisons 
1990 1995 
Total Non-Phase Non-Phase 
Sample One One 
Plant Plant Plant 
Efficiency Score Range Distribution Distribution Distribution 
1.00 19 9 10 
0.90-0.99 12 4 8 
0.80-0.89 16 6 10 
0.70-0.79 16 10 6 
0.60-0.69 29 16 13 
0.50-0.59 32 14 18 
0.40-0.49 21 8 13 
0.30-0.39 17 11 6 
0.20-0.29 6 6 0 
N 168 84 84 
Mean 0.65 0.62 0.67 
Standard Deviation 0.21 0.22 0.20 
Minimum 0.23 0.23 0.31 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 
a This table reports the distribution and summary statistics for the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
scores for the sample plants. These scores are presented on: 1) a cross-sectional (between) plant type basis; 
and (2) a longitudinal (within) plant type basis. DEA Score are bound between zero and one. Thus, the 
maximum DEA score is equal to one. 
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TABLElO 
Phase One Malmquist Productivity Indexes and Their Decomposition (n = 84)8 
Phase Catch- Frontier Phase Catch- Frontier 
One Malmquist Up Shift One Malmquist Up Shift 
Plant Index Effect Effect Plant Index Effect Effect 
P0-63 1.998117 1.397013 1.430279 P0-75 1.136542 1.024099 1.109797 
P0-32 1.616576 1.243594 1.299922 P0-44 1.124605 0.986996 1.139421 
P0-62 1.505976 1.473497 1.022042 P0-42 1.113746 1.013495 1.098916 
P0-79 1.445558 1.276012 1.132871 P0-66 1.107385 0.953676 1.161176 
P0-47 1.423572 1.226178 1.160983 P0-74 1.104692 0.981924 1.125028 
P0-39 1.42022 1.262098 1.125285 P0-41 1.089629 0.896191 1.215845 
P0-15 1.418822 1.306154 1.086259 P0-35 1.070595 0.950357 1.126519 
P0-13 1.409057 1.181927 1.192169 P0-54 1.061961 0.955792 1.11108 
P0-78 1.395606 1.277009 1.092871 P0-37 1.060144 0.965891 1.097582 
P0-03 1.382821 1.092194 1.266095 P0-48 1.058525 0.93377 1.133604 
P0-04 1.379774 0.833426 1.655545 P0-07 1.05494 1.017934 1.036354 
P0-16 1.377662 1.053978 1.307107 P0-21 1.051145 0.931054 1.128985 
P0-72 1.376413 1.254269 1.097382 P0-23 1.045968 1.0302 1.015306 
P0-50 1.363251 1.196162 1.139688 P0-33 1.045826 0.895855 1.167406 
P0-68 1.354211 1.211266 1.118013 P0-31 1.037579 0.918383 1.129789 
P0-43 1.346866 1.203011 1.119578 P0-10 1.035126 0.97747 1.058985 
P0-22 1.343228 1.269317 1.058229 P0-40 1.02417 0.989342 1.035204 
P0-67 1.335717 0.902984 1.479225 P0-14 1.018136 0.900458 1.130687 
P0-56 1.331017 1.224483 1.087004 P0-86 1.012789 0.908944 1.114248 
P0-28 1.324398 1.18353 1.119023 P0-73 1.006443 0.914197 1.100904 
P0-46 1.32328 1.089861 1.214174 P0-08 1.002688 0.907547 1.104833 
P0-29 1.320122 1.189415 1.109892 P0-61 1.002602 0.908054 1.104122 
P0-18 1.314101 1.168765 1.12435 P0-58 0.995564 0.918532 1.083864 
P0-53 1.306385 1.192233 1.095747 P0-34 0.991227 0.895306 1.107138 
P0-06 1.299056 0.967457 1.342754 P0-85 0.983426 1 0.983426 
P0-19 1.283132 1.157182 1.108842 P0-36 0.979024 1.00654 0.972663 
P0-38 1.270512 1.147961 1.106755 P0-02 0.957662 0.848727 1.128352 
P0-45 1.25299 1.115636 1.123117 P0-30 0.941902 0.843636 1.11648 
P0-84 1.243848 1.193314 1.042347 P0..:65 0.901965 0.825003 1.093287 
P0-81 1.23852 1.043282 1.187138 P0-52 0.891352 0.840497 1.060506 
P0-24 1.237252 1.123451 1.101295 P0-59 0.875128 0.818509 1.069174 
P0-25 1.232183 1.125066 1.095209 P0-57 0.862962 0.880374 0.980221 
P0-82 1.220944 1.033579 1.181278 P0-09 0.861276 0.751769 1.145665 
P0-26 1.217964 1.024547 1.188783 P0-49 0.847167 0.759266 1.115771 
P0-27 1.200678 1.093905 1.097608 P0-77 0.825891 0.44019 1.876215 
P0-55 1.192743 1.068649 1.116122 P0-69 0.810425 0.748889 1.08217 
P0-01 1.186853 1.143324 1.038073 P0-11 0.796832 0.712408 1.118506 
P0-80 1.185825 1.061001 1.117647 P0-17 0.772639 0.678417 1.138885 
P0-20 1.173592 1.056906 1.110404 P0-05 0.70079 0.629175 1.113823 
P0-51 1.172639 1.05967 1.106608 P0-76 0.686713 0.562188 1.221499 
P0-71 1.155257 1.036206 1.114892 P0-64 0.584539 0.573632 1.019013 
P0-70 1.151613 1.079233 1.067066 P0-60 0.436665 0.351266 1.24312 
a This table reports the changes in productivity between 1990 and 1995 of the Phase One (PO) plants based 
on the DEA based Malmquist Productivity Index and its two components: 1) a change in efficiency (i.e., 
the catching-up effect); and 2) a change in the efficient frontier technology (i.e., the frontier shift). The 
contents of the table are presented in descending order based on the Malmquist Productivity Index. 
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TABLE 11 
Non-Phase One Malmquist Productivity Indexes and Their Decomposition (n = 84)8 
NonPhase Catch- Frontier NonPhase Catch- Frontier 
One Malmquist Up Shift One Malmquist Up Shift 
Plant Index Effect Effect Plant Index Effect Effect 
NP0-41 2.063284 1.572062 1.31247 NP0-67 1.161851 1.179535 0.985008 
NP0-48 2.016323 1.555578 1.296189 NP0-77 1.15918 0.90161 1.285678 
NP0-73 2.000387 1.697561 1.178389 NP0-40 1.153652 0.980625 1.176446 
NP0-44 1.963719 1.76569 1.112154 NP0-35 1.153047 0.784923 1.468994 
NP0-17 1.950501 1.441912 1.352718 NP0-11 1.13288 0.927001 1.222092 
NP0-70 1.913443 1.404753 1.36212 NP0-37 1.131427 0.796644 1.420243 
NP0-19 1.844568 1.407434 1.310589 NP0-68 1.129475 1 1.129475 
NP0-09 1.686747 1.489293 1.132582 NP0-49 1.127231 0.853429 1.320826 
NP0-20 1.661315 1.36455 1.217482 · NP0-05 1.124905 0.877438 1.282033 
NP0-22 1.595645 1.138201 1.4019 NP0-25 1.123872 0.856833 1.311658 
NP0-31 1.554914 0.939801 1.654514 NP0-21 1.117578 0.84453 1.323314 
NP0-76 1.538324 1.183198 1.300141 NP0-45 1.109204 0.886673 1.250972 
NP0-32 1.517989 1.07558 1.411321 NP0-66 1.098873 0.839836 1.308437 
NP0-34 1.494573 0.909319 1.643617 NP0-59 1.062353 0.847312 1.253792 
NP0-50 1.475607 1.024366 1.440507 NP0-53 1.053648 0.815625 1.291829 
NP0-84 1.45875 0.99635 1.464094 NP0-52 1.041706 0.823868 1.26441 
NP0-28 1.427488 0.979776 1.456952 NP0-86 1.040371 0.867403 1.19941 
NP0-24 1.421372 1.059799 1.341171 NP0-82 1.011944 0.68492 1.477462 
NP0-79 1.413045 0.941714 1.500503 NP0-46 1.001644 0.767677 1.304772 
NP0-47 1.405492 1.142625 1.230056 NP0-36 1.000982 0.967359 1.034758 
NP0-80 1.39348 1.115579 1.249109 NP0-42 0.987307 0.763013 1.293959 
NP0-81 1.372535 1.074846 1.276959 NP0-62 0.980745 0.6821 1.437832 
NP0-33 1.356233 1.04177 1.301855 NP0-29 0.947233 0.687483 1.377828 
NP0-13 1.321809 1.024825 1.28979 NP0-14 0.937392 0.724113 1.294537 
NP0-06 1.313419 1.080084 1.216034 NP0-08 0.932758 0.741643 1.257691 
NP0-74 1.311593 1.004893 1.305207 NP0-78 0.91857 0.875053 1.049731 
NP0-27 1.310911 1.031444 1.270947 NP0-39 0.910295 0.78067 1.166043 
NP0-72 1.310171 1.122442 1.16725 NP0-02 0.907073 0.70243 1.291337 
NP0-30 1.28885 1.191865 1.081372 NP0-51 0.897986 0.728918 1.231944 
NP0-54 1.269169 0.971438 1.306485 NP0-58 0.890643 0.657273 1.355058 
NP0-69 1.256924 0.905378 1.388287 NP0-55 0.883394 0.748959 1.179496 
NP0-75 1.251773 1.177079 1.063457 NP0-23 0.872291 0.60229 1.44829 
NP0-38 1.24747 0.90477 1.378771 NP0-71 0.848611 0.788229 1.076604 
NP0-63 1.24719 1.621574 0.769123 NP0-85 0.781253 0.560065 1.394934 
NP0-04 1.238263 1.181292 1.048227 NP0-26 0.779356 0.617113 1.262908 
NP0-56 1.219179 1.045906 1.165668 NP0-64 0.778263 0.767299 1.014289 
NP0-43 1.217343 0.89483 1.360418 NP0-60 0.775971 0.607589 1.277132 
NP0-16 1.21726 1.171421 1.039131 NP0-07 0.746724 1.179015 0.633345 
NP0-01 1.192647 0.921046 1.294884 NP0-57 0.700566 0.62339 1.1238 
NP0-10 1.188633 0.899754 1.321065 NP0-03 0.693506 0.676931 1.024487 
NP0-15 1.182521 0.880583 1.342884 NP0-18 0.501524 1.003206 0.499921 
NP0-65 1.178252 0.731962 1.609717 NP0-61 0.28739 0.245154 1.172283 
a This table reports the changes in productivity between 1990 and 1995 of the Non-Phase One (NPO) plants 
based on the DEA based Malmquist Productivity Index and its two components: 1) a change in efficiency 
(i.e., the catching-up effect); and 2) a change in the efficient frontier technology (i.e., the frontier shift). The 
contents of the table are presented in descending order based on the Malmquist Productivity Index. 
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TABLE12 
Malmquist Productivity Indices and Their Decompositiona 
Model: 
2 I 
M Ej2 E j2 Ml,2 1 2 T 
·12=-1-·-2-= M ·12· F:' ' E 
J, E E CJ, '} 
jl j2 
Panel A: Phase One MP/ Analysis Panel B: Non-Phase One MP/ Analysis 
Phase One Plants Non Phase One Plants 
Plant Frontier Frontier 
.Type Malmquist Catch-Up Shift Malmquist Catch-Up Shift 
Statistics Index Effect Effect Index Effect Effect 
Mean 1.139 1.003 1.141 1.204 0.968 1.256 
Plants with index < 1 20 39 3 22 51 4 
Plants with index = 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Plants with index > 1 64 44 81 62 32 80 
N 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Prob> ITI 5.31 * 0.15 10.00* 5.47 * -1.06 12.77* 
(0.0001) (0.8784) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.2944) (0.0001) 
a This table reports the changes in productivity between 1990 and 1995 of the Phase One and the Non-Phase One plants using a DEA based Malmquist 
productivity index. This index, denotes as M .1 , provides a comparison of the productivity ofDMU j between two time periods 1 and 2. One of ], ,2 
the most important contributions of a DEA based MPI is that it can be multiplicatively decomposed into two parts: one accounting for the changes in 
efficiency (i.e., the catching-up effect) and the other accounting for changes in the efficient frontier technology (i.e., the frontier shift). When 
evaluating a DEA based MPI and its components, amounts greater than one indicate progress, while numbers smaller than one show regress. Amounts 
equal to one represent no change between the two periods. Amounts in parenthesis contain the p-values for a one-sample test and* p < 0.0001 
TABLE 13 
Cross Sectional Analyses of Productive Efficiencya 
H 11: 1990 Phase One Plant verses 1990 Non-Phase One Plant Efficiency b 
Z-score 
Prob<Z 
H 12: 1995 Phase One Plant verses 1995 Non-Phase One Plant Efficiency c 
Z-score 
Prob<Z 
2.14* 
(0.02) 
-1.63* 
(0.05) 
• This table provides the results of Hypothesis One testing. The amount in parenthesis contains the p-value for a one-
sided Wilcoxon rank sum test where * p < 0.05. 
b Hypothesis One pertains to cross-sectional relative efficiency. The 1990 null hypothesis assumes that the expected 
rank sum of the Phase One plants is greater than the expected rank sum of the Non-Phase One plants. Rejection of the 
null will provide support for Hypothesis One. Tests reveal that the expected rank sum of 1990 Phase One is 
significantly greater than that of the 1990 Non-Phase One plants. These results do not support Hypothesis One and 
provides evidence that the traditional approach to pollution control was in place prior to intervention. 
c Hypothesis One pertains to cross-sectional relative efficiency. The 1995 null hypothesis assumes that the expected 
rank sum of the Non-Phase One plants is greater than that of the 1995 Phase One plants. Rejection of the null will 
provide support for Hypothesis One. Tests reveal that the expected rank sum of the 1995 Phase One plant is 
significantly higher than that of the 1995 Non-Non-Phase One plants. These results provide some support for 
Hypothesis One and indicate that the Act did induce eco-efficient behavior. 
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TABLE14 
Longitudinal Analyses of Productive Efficiency8 
H21 : 1990 Phase One Plant verses 1995 Phase One Plant Efficiency h 
Z-score 
Prob<Z 
H22: 1990 Non-Phase One Plant verses 1995 Non-Phase One Plant Efficiency c 
Z-score 
Prob<Z 
-1.56 ** 
(0.06) 
-1.22 
(0.11) 
a This table provides the results of Hypothesis Two testing. The amount in parenthesis contains the p-value for a one-
sided Wilcoxon rank sum test where ** p < 0.10. 
b Hypothesis Two pertains to longitudinal relative efficiency. The null hypothesis for Phase One plants assumes that the 
expected rank sum of the 1990 Phase One plants will be greater than those of 1995. Rejection of the null will provide 
support for Hypothesis Two. Tests reveal that the expected rank sum of the 1995 Phase One plant is significantly 
greater than that of the 1990 Phase One plants. These results support Hypothesis Two. 
c Hypothesis Two pertains to longitudinal relative efficiency. The null hypothesis for Non Phase One plants assumes 
that the expected rank sum of the 1995 Non-Phase One plants will be greater than those of 1990. Rejection of the null 
will provide support for Hypothesis Two. Tests reveal that the 1995 Non-Phase One efficiency is not statistically 
greater than that of the 1990 Non-Phase One plants. These results support Hypothesis Two. 
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Table 15 
Correlation Coefficients for Longitudinal Analysis of Phase One Plantsa 
(n = 168) 
STRICT CLIM EVENT DEA 
STRICT 1.0000 0.1488 0.0000 -0.2022 
(0.0542) * (1.00) (0.0086)** 
CLIM 1.0000 0.0251 -0.0476 
(0.7467) (0.5394) 
EVENT 1.0000 0.1233 
(0.1112) 
DEA 1.0000 
a This table is the correlation matrix for the regression model of the longitudinal analysis of the Phase One 
plants. The amounts in parenthesis contain the p-value for a two-tailed test and* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.01. 
The variable definitions are: 
STRICT = Measures the stringency of state environmentalism. 
CLIM = Measures how favorably a state regulatory commission addresses rate increase requests. 
EVENT = Dummy variable equal to one if 1995 and zero if 1990. 
DEA = The data envelopment (efficiency) scores of the electric utility plants. These scores lie between 
zero and one. 
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Table 16 
Correlation Coefficients for Longitudinal Analysis of Non-Phase One Plants3 
(n = 168) 
STRICT CLIM EVENT DEA 
STRICT 1.0000 0.1643 0.0000 -0.1710 
(0.0332) * (1.0000) (0.0267) * 
CLIM 1.0000 0.0183 -0.1033 
(0.8139) (0.1824) 
EVENT 1.0000 0.1095 
(0.1573) 
DEA 1.0000 
a This table is the correlation matrix for the regression model of the longitudinal analysis of the Non-Phase 
One plants. The amounts in parenthesis contain the p-value for a two-tailed test and* p < 0.05. The 
variable definitions are: 
STRICT = Measures the stringency of state environmentalism. 
CLIM = Measures how favorably a state regulatory commission addresses rate increase requests. 
EVENT = Dummy variable equal to one if 1995 and zero if 1990. 
DEA = The data envelopment (efficiency) scores of the electric utility plants. These scores lie between 
zero and one. 
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TYPE 
STRICT 
CLIM 
EVENT 
DEA 
Table 17 
Correlation Coefficients for Longitudinal Analysis of All Plantsa 
(n = 336) 
TYPE STRICT CLIM EVENT DEA 
1.0000 -0.0819 0.0833 0.0000 0.1486 
(0.1339) (0.1273) (1.0000) (0.0063) * 
1.0000 0.1506 0.0000 -0.2073 
(0.0057) * (1.0000) (0.0001) ** 
1.0000 0.0208 -0.05809 
(0.7035) (0.2884) 
1.0000 0.1019 
(0.0618) *** 
1.0000 
a This table is the correlation matrix for the regression model of the longitudinal analysis of all of the plants 
in the study. This would include both Phase One and Non-Phase One plants. The amounts in parenthesis 
contain the p-value for a two-tailed test and* p < 0.01 **p < 0.0001, and p < 0.10. The variable 
definitions are: 
TYPE = Dummy variable equal to one if Phase One Plant and zero if a Non-Phase One plant. 
STRICT = Measures the stringency of state environmentalism. 
CLIM = Measures how favorably a state regulatory commission addresses rate increase requests. 
EVENT = Dummy variable equal to one if 1995 and zero if 1990. 
DEA = The data envelopment ( efficiency) scores of the electric utility plants. These scores lie between 
zero and one. 
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TABLE18 
Longitudinal Tests of the Effect of the 1990 CAAA on Efficiency3 
Model One: 
Panel A: 1990 verses 1995 Phase One Plants (n = 168) 
Po P1 
(+) 
Coefficient Estimate 0.7135 0.0461 
t-value 32.34 1.55 
p-value 0.0001 0.06 * 
Panel B: 1990 verses 199 5 Non-Phase One Plants (N = 168) 
Coefficient Estimate 
t-value 
p-value 
0.6538 
23.68 
0.0001 
P1 
(+) 
0.0503 
1.38 
0.08 * 
P2 
-(-) 
-0.003 
-0.10 
0.45 
P2 
(-) 
-0.0272 
-0.96 
0.17 
p3 
-(+) 
-0.0635 
-2.68 
0.004 *** 
p3 
(+) 
-0.046 
-1.99 
0.02 ** 
Panel C: 1990/1995 Phase One verses 1990/1995 Non-Phase One Plants (n = 336) 
Po P1 P2 p3 
- - -(+) (-) (+) 
Coefficient Estimate 0.6394 0.0412 -0.0126 -0.0559 
t-value 31.07 1.84 -0.63 -3.56 
p4 
-(+) 
0.0550 
2.44 
p-value 0.0001 0.03 ** 0.26 0.0002***** 0.0073 **** 
• This table provides the regression results related to Hypothesis Two. Model One represents plant-type 
specific regression tests for both the pooled 1990/1995 Phase One and the pooled 1990/1995 Non-Phase 
One plants. Model Two represents a regression test pooling of all plants (Phase One and Non-Phase One) 
for both years and* p < 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p < 0.005, **** p < 0.01, and***** p< 0.0005. The 
variable definitions are: 
EVENT 
CLIM 
STRICT 
TYPE 
= Dummy variable equal to one if 1995 and equal to zero if 1990. 
= Measures how favorably a state regulatory commission addresses rate increases. 
= Measures the stringency of state environmental policies 
= Dummy variab~e equal to one if Phase One Plant and zero if a Non-Phase One plant. 
103 
Pollution 
Y2 
APPENDIXB 
FIGURE 1 
Traditional Output Production Trade-offs 
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FIGURE2 
Eco-Efficient Reactions to Environmental Regulation 
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FIGURE3 
DEA Efficiency Frontier Estimation 
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